University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2020

The Arbitration Rules: Procedural Rulemaking by Arbitration
Providers
David Horton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Horton, David, "The Arbitration Rules: Procedural Rulemaking by Arbitration Providers" (2020). Minnesota
Law Review. 3213.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3213

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

The Arbitration Rules: Procedural Rulemaking
by Arbitration Providers
David Horton†
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v.
Varela,1 its latest controversial opinion about class actions and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 A hacker had stolen the personal information of 1,300 employees at Lamps Plus, a major lighting retailer,
and used it to file fraudulent tax returns in their names.3 Frank Varela,
a victim of the scam, brought a class action against Lamps Plus in federal court in California for negligence and violation of federal and state
statutes.4 But to initially obtain his job, Varela had needed to sign a
contract in which he agreed to arbitrate “all claims or controversies . . .
that [he] may have against the [c]ompany.”5
Varela and Lamps Plus disagreed about whether this language—
which did not mention class actions—allowed Varela to pursue class
claims in arbitration.6 The district court and the Ninth Circuit applied
California contract law to construe the ambiguity against Lamps Plus
and hold that the clause authorized class arbitration.7
† Professor of Law and Chancellor’s Fellow, University of California, Davis,
School of Law. Thanks to David Noll for helpful comments and Cooper Christiancy for
outstanding editorial assistance. Copyright © 2020 by David Horton.
1. 139 S. Ct. 1407.
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
3. Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 3, Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. 5:16-cv00577 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016).
4. Id. at ¶¶ 51–103.
5. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577, 2016 WL 9110161, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
July 7, 2016).
6. See id. at *6.
7. See id. at *7 (“[T]he drafter of an adhesion contract must be held responsible
for any ambiguity in the agreement.”); Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 673
(9th Cir. 2017) (“State contract principles require construction against Lamps Plus, the
drafter of the adhesive Agreement.”).
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However, the Supreme Court saw the issue through a different
prism.8 Speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, the Court explained
that Congress passed the FAA to facilitate simple, fast, and cheap dispute resolution.9 In turn, the Court reasoned, class arbitration “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment.”10 Thus, the Court concluded
that California contract principles were irrelevant and that the FAA
“requires more than ambiguity to ensure that the parties actually
agreed to arbitrate on a classwide basis.”11
Lamps Plus provoked strong reactions. Each liberal Justice wrote
his or her own dissent.12 For example, Justice Ginsburg objected that
because virtually no consumers and employees will prosecute their
own claims, “mandating single-file arbitration serves as a means of
erasing rights.”13 Justice Kagan condemned the majority for ignoring
the fact that the FAA embraces—rather than eclipses—state contract
principles such as California’s interpretation-against-the-drafter doctrine.14 Justice Sotomayor observed that nobody who signs a simple
arbitration provision like Frank Varela’s will realize that they are forfeiting their ability to represent a class.15 Likewise, critics called
Lamps Plus a “revolution” in the Court’s FAA jurisprudence.16 They argued that because the opinion transforms all arbitration provisions
into class action bans, corporations can “rip you off and do it legally.”17
8. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019).
9. See id. at 1416 (“[T]he virtues Congress originally saw in arbitration [were]
its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness . . . .” (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018))).
10. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)).
11. Id. at 1415.
12. See id. at 1420–22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1422–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 1427–28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 1428–35 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Judith Resnik, Revising Our
“Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1888 (2016)).
14. See id. at 1428 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[A]n employee who signs an arbitration agreement should not be expected to realize that she is giving up access to
[class actions].”). Justice Breyer joined Justices Ginsburg’s and Kagan’s dissents, and
also wrote separately to opine that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. See id. at 1422–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Consequently, I would hold that we
lack jurisdiction over this case.”).
16. Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV.
1119, 1160 (2019).
17. Chris Jenkins, How Your Bank, Others Can Rip You Off and Do It Legally, CIN.
ENQUIRER: OP. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/opinion/2019/08/
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But for some consumers and employees, Lamps Plus changed
nothing. Years earlier, they had lost their ability to bring a class arbitration even though they, like Frank Varela, were bound by arbitration
clauses that did not mention class actions. The decision to delete their
rights did not generate headlines and was neither handed down by a
judge nor announced in Congress. Instead, it was made in an office
building in Garden City, New York18 An entity called National Arbitration and Mediation (NAM), which administers arbitrations, adopted
an internal rule that bars class actions “[i]f the [a]rbitration agreement is silent with respect to [them].”19 Thus, anyone whose arbitration agreement merely selected NAM to handle the case had signed a
clandestine class action waiver.
***
In 2015, Dr. Jensine Andresen sued her former employer for violating federal and state employment statutes.20 She alleged that her
supervisor had sexually harassed her, discriminated against her because of her gender and age, and illegally withheld her overtime pay.21
26/opinion-how-your-bank-others-can-rip-you-off-and-do-legally/2010003001
[https://perma.cc/Z8KA-E6D7]; see also James Bogan III & Allen Garrett Jr., Class Arbitration Is—Almost—Dead, JD SUPRA (July 22, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/class-arbitration-is-almost-dead-60871 [https://perma.cc/6GJ5-CDGQ]
(explaining how Lamps Plus decision “refused to address whether class arbitration
constitutes a ‘question of arbitrability’ presumptively for courts, rather than arbitrators, to decide”); Bloomberg, Supreme Court Gives Businesses More Power to Require
Individual Arbitration, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://www.latimes
.com/business/la-fi-arbitration-supreme-court-class-action-lamps-plus-20190424
-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20190426041600/https://www.latimes
.com/business/la-fi-arbitration-supreme-court-class-action-lamps-plus-20190424
-story.html] (explaining that Lamps Plus “help[s] companies avoid the prospect of
costly class actions filed by workers and consumers”); Adam Liptak, Split 5 to 4, Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Class Arbitrations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/supreme-court-class-arbitrations.html
[https://perma.cc/KU55-LPWG] (noting that decisions like Lamps Plus “can make it
difficult for consumers and workers to pursue minor claims even where their collective harm was substantial”).
18. Conference Facilities Nationwide, NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, https://www
.namadr.com/about/locations [https://perma.cc/2DEY-PX43] (explaining location of
National Arbitration and Mediation’s headquarters).
19. NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, EMPLOYMENT RULES AND PROCEDURES r.12.f.iii, at 8
(2017) [hereinafter NAM EMPLOYMENT RULES], https://www.namadr.com/content/
uploads/2016/07/Emp-Rules_and_Proced.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q7R-BWHY]. For
information on the location of NAM’s offices, see Contact Us, NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION,
https://www.namadr.com/about/contact-us [https://perma.cc/YUZ8-C9PX].
20. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Monetary Relief and Jury Demand ¶¶ 204–31, Andresen v. IntePros Fed. Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00446 (D.D.C. Mar. 26,
2015).
21. See id.
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But when Dr. Andresen had accepted her position, she had signed a
contract that required any future dispute to be “determined by arbitration [in] . . . the American Arbitration Association [(AAA)] in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules.”22
This single sentence transformed the procedural landscape of
Andresen’s case. Not only did it mandate arbitration, but it selected a
procedural code—the AAA’s Commercial Rules—that was designed to
govern business-to-business disputes23 and thus was inhospitable to
Dr. Andresen’s employment claims. For example, Dr. Andresen would
have only needed to pay $400 to bring her lawsuit in the judicial system.24 Conversely, the AAA Rules saddled her with a $7,500 filing fee
and a minimum of $8,200 in other expenses, including the cost of the
arbitrator’s salary and renting a room for the hearing.25 Dr. Andresen
asked a federal court to nullify the arbitration clause, arguing that she
must “pay rent, pay a mortgage, pay credit card debt, and pay for utilities, while relying on a modest monthly salary.”26 Yet AAA Commercial Rule 7(a) states that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule
on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect
to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement . . . .”27
Thus, as paradoxical as it sounds, the court held that the AAA Rules
required Dr. Andresen to arbitrate the very question of whether she
needed to arbitrate the merits of her lawsuit.28
***
In September 2019, nearly 4,000 food delivery couriers filed separate arbitrations alleging that food delivery service DoorDash had

22. Andresen v. IntePros Fed., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 143, 147 (D.D.C. 2017).
23. AM. ARB. ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 10
(2016) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/
files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL6E-NEW4] (observing that the
Commercial Rules are not supposed to govern employment cases).
24. Andresen, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 158.
25. See id. at 157–58.
26. Id. at 158–59.
27. AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at R7(a).
28. Under longstanding precedent, courts invalidate arbitration agreements that
impose excessive costs and therefore thwart the plaintiff’s exercise of her federal statutory rights. See Andresen, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 154. Invoking this rule, the court forced
Dr. Andresen’s employer to pay arbitration-specific costs related to her pursuit of her
federal statutory claims. See id. at 163. However, the court refused to apply this rule to
Dr. Andresen’s state statutory claims, thus tasking her with paying to arbitrate the
question of whether it was unfair to compel her to arbitrate the merits of these allegations. See id. at 163 n.14.
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violated state labor laws.29 The plaintiffs admitted that they were
bound by DoorDash’s arbitration clause, which chose the AAA’s Commercial Rules, and had waived their right to band together in a class
action.30 But the “Dashers” had initiated so many discrete claims that
the AAA Rules saddled DoorDash with a pre-hearing deposit of $11
million.31 DoorDash refused to pay, prompting the AAA to terminate
the arbitrations.32 As a result, the plaintiffs found themselves in limbo:
contractually bound to arbitrate, but blocked from pursuing their
cases in that forum.33
***
In 1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, which instructed the Supreme Court to create “general rules of practice and
procedure.”34 The Court delegated this task to an Advisory Committee
of five law professors and nine lawyers.35 This group set out to create
a regime in which procedure receded into the background “so that
cases could more easily be decided on the merits.”36 Its handiwork, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, went into effect in 1938.37
At the risk of stating the obvious, the Federal Rules proved to be
influential. About half of the states passed procedural codes modeled
on the Rules, and even jurisdictions that did not copy the Committee’s
handiwork adopted schemes that “line[] up with federal court

29. Petitioner’s Petition to Compel Arbitration; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support ¶ 1, Boyd v. DoorDash, Inc., No. CPF-19-516930 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019) [hereinafter DoorDash Petition].
30. Independent Contractor Agreement, Declaration of Ashley Keller in Support
of Petitioners’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Ex.
B at 7, Boyd (No. CPF-19-516930).
31. See id. at ¶¶ 18–19; Kathleen Dailey, DoorDash Says Couriers Can’t Block New
Arbitration Agreements, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw
.com/daily-labor-report/doordash-says-couriers-cant-block-new-arbitration
-agreements [https://perma.cc/8875-HNEV].
32. See DoorDash Petition, supra note 29, at ¶ 29.
33. See id. at ¶ 30.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b).
35. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 971 (1987).
36. Id. at 986; see also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288 (2013) (“[T]he distinguished proceduralists who drafted the
Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the courts and in the resolution of disputes
on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.”).
37. FED. R. CIV. P. historical note at vii (2019) (“The original rules, pursuant to act
of June 19, 1934 . . . became effective September 16, 1938.”).
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practice.”38 Thus, the Federal Rules dominate civil procedure so much
that they are practically synonymous with the field. Most procedural
scholarship and law reform focuses on the Federal Rules, and law students “learn[] about civil litigation through a Federal Rules filter.”39
But Varela, Dr. Andresen, and thousands of DoorDashers did not
have the benefit of these iconic procedural rules. In 1925, Congress
passed the FAA to encourage merchants to resolve breach of contract
disputes privately.40 But in the 1980s, the Court hijacked the statute,
holding that it preempts state law,41 governs federal statutory
claims,42 and embodies a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”43
Forced arbitration clauses became “a phenomenon that pervade[s]
virtually every corner of the daily economy.”44 As a result, the FAA
funnels tens of thousands of disputes each year into arbitration providers, such as NAM,45 the AAA,46 ADR Services, Inc.,47 Alternative Resolution Centers (ARC),48 the ADR Forum (Forum),49 the International
Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR),50 Judicial Mediation and Arbitration Services (JAMS),51 Judicate West (JW),52 and
38. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1049
(2016).
39. Subrin, supra note 35, at 910.
40. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14).
41. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“We see nothing in the
[FAA] indicating that [its] broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional
limitations under state law.”).
42. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (ordering arbitration of complex Sherman Act allegations).
43. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
44. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1429 (2008).
45. See About, NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, https://www.namadr.com [https://perma
.cc/6ZHC-GNDU].
46. See What We Do, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/Arbitration [https://
perma.cc/U4XK-CDPT].
47. See About ADR Services, Inc., ADR SERVS., INC., https://www.adrservices.com/
about [https://perma.cc/9PJJ-XFPQ].
48. See About Us, ALT. RESOL. CTRS., https://www.arc4adr.com/about-us.php
[https://perma.cc/P5SC-QZVE].
49. See About Us, FORUM, https://www.adrforum.com/about [https://perma.cc/
56W3-2PPE].
50. See What We Do, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., https://www
.cpradr.org/about [https://perma.cc/N45S-KYCW].
51. See About Us, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about [https://perma.cc/
RWA8-4B3B].
52. See About Judicate West, JUDICATE W., https://www.judicatewest.com/Firm/
About [https://perma.cc/D3FG-RKZ8].
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U.S. Arbitration and Mediation (USA&M).53 In turn, these organizations have created their own procedural codes.54 I call these private
versions of federal and state rules of civil procedure the “Arbitration
Rules.”
The Arbitration Rules are both important and poorly understood.
The contracts of Fortune 500 companies like Amazon,55 AT&T,56

53. See Arbitration, U.S. ARB. & MEDIATION, https://usam.com/arbitration
[https://perma.cc/89EB-7UPR].
54. See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23; ADR SERVS., INC., ARBITRATION
RULES (2017) [hereinafter ADR SERVICES RULES], https://www.adrservices.com/wp
-content/uploads/2017/04/ADR-ARBITRATION-RULES-Final-Version-4-11-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UNJ-5MY9]; ALT. RESOL. CTRS., ARBITRATION RULES (2011) [hereinafter ARC RULES], https://www.arc4adr.com/forms/arbitration_rules.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P6NL-HP72]; 2019 Administered Arbitration Rules, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT
PREVENTION & RESOL. (Mar. 1, 2019) [hereinafter CPR Rules], https://www.cpradr.org/
resource-center/rules/arbitration/administered-arbitration-rules-2019 [https://
www.perma.cc/TK8W-W34U]; FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING BUSINESS-TOBUSINESS DISPUTES (2019), https://www.adrforum.com/assets/resources/Arbitration/Rules/Forum.B2B_Rules.v2.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN4M-WXZE]; JAMS,
COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2014) [hereinafter JAMS
COMPREHENSIVE RULES], https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/ZTQ4-XMTR]; Commercial Arbitration Rules, JUDICATE W. [hereinafter JW Commercial Rules], https://www.judicatewest.com/Resources/Arbitration
Rules [https://perma.cc/YC5W-ZLU3]; U.S. ARB. & MEDIATION, CONSOLIDATED
ARBITRATION RULES (2019) [hereinafter USA&M RULES], https://usam.com/wp
-content/uploads/2019/03/consolidated-arbitration-rules-3.28.19.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FW7U-A8YS].
55. See Conditions of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 [https://perma
.cc/9S63-J49E] (referring to AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related
Disputes).
56. See Resolve a Dispute with AT&T Via Arbitration, AT&T WIRELESS, https://
www.att.com/support/article/wireless/KM1045585 [https://perma.cc/KQ8U
-KN2A] (referring to AAA’s Commercial Rules as modified by its Supplementary Procedure for Consumer Related Disputes).
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CVS,57 Exxon Mobile,58 Federal Express,59 General Motors,60 Google,61
Verizon,62 Walgreens,63 Walmart,64 Wells Fargo,65 and Xfinity66 incorporate a specific set of Arbitration Rules by reference. Also, because
providers deem any party who uses their services to have accepted
their Arbitration Rules, their codes guide the path of most disputes
they handle.67 Finally, as the stories that begin this Article illustrate,
the Arbitration Rules govern hot-button topics, such as the availability
of class relief, the line between judicial and arbitral jurisdiction, and
mass arbitrations.68 Surprisingly, though, the Arbitration Rules have

57. See Terms of Use, CVS PHARMACY (March 21, 2019), https://www.cvs.com/
help/terms_of_use.jsp [https://perma.cc/EMA2-XYCW] (referring to AAA Consumer
Arbitration Rules).
58. See Exxon Mobil Rewards+ Program Terms and Conditions, EXXON MOBIL (July
11, 2018), https://www.exxon.com/en/exxon-mobil-rewards-plus-terms [https://
perma.cc/7MRR-QPKK] (referring to AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules).
59. See User Terms, ONSTAR (May 1, 2018), https://www.onstar.com/us/en/user_
terms [https://perma.cc/RRK5-7RVC] (referring to AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules).
60. See FedEx Tech Manager Terms and Conditions, FEDEX, http://www.fedex
.com/techmanager/terms [https://perma.cc/HZD8-TLCF] (referring to AAA Commercial Rules).
61. See Payment Methods & Terms of Service Finder, GOOGLE, https://www
.google.com/ads/terms (from “Product” drop-down, select “Google Ads”; from “Billing
country” drop-down, select “United States (US)”; from “Currency” drop-down, select
“US Dollar ($)”) (referring to AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules).
62. See My Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement, VERIZON, https://www.verizon
.com/legal/notices/customer-agreement [https://perma.cc/6JRM-3UMF] (referring
to AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules).
63. See Terms of Use, WALGREENS BOOTS ALL., https://www.walgreensboots
alliance.com/terms-use [https://perma.cc/E9GC-7F6X] (referring to AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes).
64. See Walmart.com Terms of Use, WALMART, https://help.walmart.com/app/
answers/detail/a_id/8#19 [https://perma.cc/T2KT-2QZR] (referring to JAMS Arbitration Streamlined Rules & Procedures).
65. See Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, XFINITY, https://www
.xfinity.com/corporate/customers/policies/subscriberagreement [https://perma.cc/
78SJ-4LMC] (referring to AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules).
66. See WELLS FARGO, DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT 4 (2019), https://www
.wellsfargo.com/fetch-pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode=ANY [https://
perma.cc/6W8T-7YCV] (referring to AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules).
67. See, e.g., ADR SERVICES RULES, supra note 54, at R1 (“[T]he parties shall be
deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration agreement whenever their
arbitration contract provides for arbitration according to the ADR Services, Inc.”); ARC
RULES, supra note 54, at R1 (“These rules shall apply whenever the parties have agreed
to arbitrate in accordance with ARC Arbitration Rules and/or whenever the parties
agree that ARC shall serve as the administrator of an arbitration.”).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 1–33.
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only received passing attention from civil procedure69 and arbitration
specialists.70
This Article explores this alternate procedural dimension. It begins by examining the forces that have made the Arbitration Rules so
crucial. The story begins in the late 1920s, when the AAA began to offer “organized” arbitration, which was more structured than traditional arbitration.71 To facilitate this quasi-judicial form of dispute
resolution, the AAA created a slate of Arbitration Rules, which functioned like a private code of civil procedure.72
As the decades passed, new providers surfaced with their own
brands of organized arbitration, which they expressed through unique
69. There is a rich body of literature on “contract procedure”: the practice of parties modifying the procedural rules that will govern any future dispute in the court
system. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2012) (analyzing whether litigants should “be
able to contract for a different pleading standard or summary judgment test, or even a
particular jury composition or method of judicial decision”); Kevin E. Davis & Helen
Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 515 (2011) (arguing
that contract procedure “permits unelected and unaccountable contract drafters to reshape a function that reasonably is regarded as a core governmental function”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103,
1127 (2011) (surveying “the extent to which the law constrains parties’ ability to contract freely for the procedures governing their dispute”); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of
Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2011) (discussing the pros and
cons of “[c]ontracts modifying the spectrum of procedure, from commonplace jurytrial waivers to sophisticated alterations of evidentiary obligations and burdens of
proof”); Jessica Erickson, Bespoke Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1873, 1876 (2018) (focusing on “ex ante agreements between two or more parties regarding how they will
collect and exchange information in any future disputes between them”). However,
these commentators have largely ignored the discrete phenomenon of procedural
rulemaking by arbitration providers.
70. A few articles have analyzed particular providers’ rules, but they are both
much more narrowly focused than this Article and decades out of date. See generally J.
Noble Braden, Sound Rules and Administration in Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 189
(1934) (assessing the AAA’s original Arbitration Rules); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 369 (2004) (analyzing
“due process protocols” that some providers have adopted for consumer and employment cases); Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A
Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 173, 215–21 (1998) (same); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural
and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J.
1289, 1314–37 (1998) (describing earlier versions of the Arbitration Rules of the AAA,
CPR, and JAMS); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J.
425 (1988) (focusing on the AAA’s Construction Rules).
71. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 22 (1948).
72. See generally AM. ARB. ASS’N, CODE OF ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL187–95 (1931) [hereinafter CODE OF ARBITRATION].
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procedural principles. Then, starting in the late twentieth century, the
Court expanded the FAA and drafters inserted forced arbitration provisions into millions of contracts, projecting the Arbitration Rules
across vast swaths of the civil justice landscape.
Next, the Article critiques the Arbitration Rules by comparing
them to the Federal Rules. It argues that these procedural kingdoms
diverge in three main ways. First, most Federal Rules are drafted by
experts who solicit input from the public and subject their proposals
to legislative veto. The Arbitration Rules lack this pedigree. Although
some are forged in a dialectic between providers, stakeholders, and
courts, others are simply imposed by for-profit entities. Second, unlike
the Federal Rules, which are trans-substantive and uniform, the Arbitration Rules are context-specific. Not only do providers’ codes differ
from each other, but the AAA, JAMS, the Forum, NAM, and USA&M
have created unique rules for particular case types, such as commercial, consumer, employment, and franchise. Third, although the Federal Rules try to generate “correct” results at an acceptable pace and
cost, the Arbitration Rules sacrifice precision at the altar of efficiency.
Of course, the fact that the Arbitration Rules deviate from the
Federal Rules is not inherently troubling. After all, the point of alternative dispute resolution is that it is not litigation.73 In fact, some of
the Arbitration Rules’ distinctive traits seem like upgrades. For example, the diversity of procedural options furthers autonomy by allowing
parties to “designate their preferred arbitration provider and rule set
from among a variety of market choices.”74 Likewise, tailoring Arbitration Rules to particular kinds of disputes allows providers like the
AAA and JAMS to create progressive regimes—known as “Due Process
Protocols” and “Minimum Standards”—that protect the rights of vulnerable parties.75 Finally, thanks in part to the sleek contours of the
Arbitration Rules, private dispute resolution has long been regarded
as quicker than litigation.76
However, procedural rulemaking by arbitration providers also
has a dark side. For one, allowing profit-seeking providers to create
their own procedural fiefdoms has predictable consequences. Over
the years, some arbitration administrators have tilted the scales of
73. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (explaining that Congress passed the FAA
to help parties avoid the costs and delay of proceedings in court).
74. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1865, 1899 (2015).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 159–65.
76. See, e.g., Bokunewicz v. Purolator Prod., Inc., 907 F.2d 1396, 1400 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that arbitration is faster than litigation).
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justice toward corporate defendants.77 Likewise, because the Federal
Rules govern all cases, they are simple and accessible. Yet the cacophony of competing Arbitration Rules—which vary by organization and
claim type—exacerbate the information asymmetry between oneshot plaintiffs and repeat-playing corporations. Finally, drafters like
Dr. Andresen’s employer have learned to game the system by selecting
unsuitable procedural packages, such as requiring employees to arbitrate under the AAA’s Commercial Rules.78
The Article then argues that courts should give these differences
greater weight when they confront three problems that hinge on the
Arbitration Rules. First, the Arbitration Rules permit arbitrators to decide “arbitrability”: the gateway issue of whether a plaintiff must arbitrate the merits of her claim. Thus, most courts have held that an
arbitration clause that merely selects a provider’s code delegates arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Article argues that these decisions are
wrong both doctrinally and as a matter of policy. Not only do they misinterpret the relevant Arbitration Rules, but they ignore the fact that
judicial review is indispensable to arbitration’s legitimacy. Second,
some corporations, like Dr. Andresen’s employer, have begun trying
to stack the deck against plaintiffs by selecting codes that are meant
for distinct matters. The Article urges judges to crack down on this
exploitative tactic. Third, the Article examines the budding phenomenon of mass arbitrations. According to the conventional wisdom, because plaintiffs will not pursue their own small claims in arbitration,
class arbitration waivers function as a “‘get out of jail free’ card” for
corporate liability.79 But as in the Doordash case mentioned above,
plaintiffs’ lawyers have begun to file thousands of stand-alone arbitrations against a single defendant for the same alleged wrongdoing.80
The Article explains how the Arbitration Rules both set this trend in
motion and will control its future.
To be clear, the Article does not analyze the entire cosmos of procedural rules in arbitration. Instead, it excludes specialist arbitration
administrators that handle specific claims (like those involving insurance)81 or particular industries (such as the New York Cotton
77. See infra text accompanying notes 223–27.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 20–28.
79. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
81. See, e.g., ARB. FS., INC., ARBITRATION FORUMS, INC. RULES (2020), https://home
.arbfile.org/ArbitrationForums/media/resources/downloads/Current_AF_Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SAC-BD7T] (offering dispute resolution services for the insurance
industry).
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Exchange or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).82 Instead,
it focuses on generalist providers such as the AAA and JAMS, which
serve as true substitutes for the court system because their procedures cover “all kinds of disputes”83 and “transcend[] . . . any given
professional or trade association.”84 In addition, the Article does not
dwell on how private procedural rulemaking affects business-to-business or post-dispute arbitrations. Instead, it concentrates on forced
arbitration, which is the white-hot center of current policy debates.
The Article contains three Parts. Part I explains how the AAA’s
first set of Arbitration Rules blended arbitration’s informal conventions with orderly, court-like procedures. Part I then details how the
advent of forced arbitration and the emergence of new providers
brought untold numbers of disputes under the umbrella of the Arbitration Rules. Part II sharpens our understanding of private procedural rulemaking by contrasting the Arbitration Rules with the Federal Rules. Part III then uses the insights from Part II to examine the
boundary between arbitral and judicial power, the opportunistic use
of Arbitration Rules, and mass arbitrations.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ARBITRATION RULES
This Part traces the evolution of the Arbitration Rules. It reveals
how the AAA created the first private procedural code as part of its
goal of bringing organized arbitration to the masses. It then explains
how a variety of factors—including the emergence of new providers
and the Court’s muscular interpretation of the FAA—made the Arbitration Rules a fixture in contemporary dispute resolution.
A. THE BIRTH OF THE ARBITRATION RULES
The early twentieth century was the apex of the procedural justice movement. In 1938, policymakers modernized litigation by enacting the Federal Rules.85 Yet, as this Section explains, our understanding of this period omits a key piece. In 1927, the AAA created the first
82. See, e.g., Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 626–27 (1934) (noting that certain industries have developed arbitration institutions with their own procedural norms); Arbitration Rules,
FINRA (2020), https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/arbitration-rules
[https://perma.cc/FL2T-7QTQ] (governing arbitration of securities disputes).
83. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 63.
84. Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2984 (2015).
85. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, U.S. CTS. https://www.uscourts.gov/rules
-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure [https://
perma.cc/RXE3-BF2W].
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set of Arbitration Rules, which laid the groundwork for organized arbitration.86
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, procedure in the United States
was a sprawling mess. Federal practice was bifurcated. In equity,
courts applied the Federal Equity Rules.87 But when a matter was at
law, the Conformity Act of 1872 instructed the judge to follow “the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding” of the state
in which it sat.88 In turn, because the Conformity Act was riddled with
exceptions, “one did not know what procedural law would apply:
state, federal, or judge-made.”89 Under this convoluted regime, “a lawyer practicing in the [f]ederal courts, even in his own state, fe[lt] no
more certainty as to the proper procedure than if he were before a
tribunal of a foreign country.”90
In many states, the situation was just as dire. For example, in New
York, procedural statutes had swollen to over a thousand provisions.91
Likewise, some jurisdictions still labored under highly technical common law procedural traditions. For instance, under the custom of single issue pleading, parties exchanged multiple filings—declarations,
demurrers, traverses, confessions, and avoidances—to whittle the
case down to a lone question of fact that was suitable for a jury to decide.92 Although this system brought a dispute to a head, it was so formalistic that “the whole fate of a law-suit depend[ed] upon the exact
words that the parties utter[ed] when they [we]re before the tribunal.”93
86. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 76.
87. See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES, at xi (3d ed. 1922)
(explaining that the rules went into effect in 1822).
88. An Act to further the Administration of Justice, Pub. L. No. 42-255, § 5, 17 Stat.
196, 197 (1872).
89. Subrin, supra note 35, at 957–58.
90. J. Newton Fiero, Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law, 19 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 411, 420 (1896); Charles Warren, Federal Process and
State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV. 546, 564 (1930) (recognizing that the Conformity Act
of 1872 has “resulted in considerable confusion in Federal practice, owing to the exceptions and limitations, which decisions of the Supreme Court have read into the
Act”).
91. See Subrin, supra note 35, at 940.
92. See HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 264 (2d ed.
1901); Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517,
526 (1925) (“[E]ach party must in turn answer the previous pleading of his adversary
by either denying, or affirming and adding new matter (confessing and avoiding) until
there is ultimately reached a stage where one side has affirmed and the other has denied a single material point in the case.”).
93. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 190 (1895).
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As is well-known, the Federal Rules, which became effective in
1938, helped clear this thicket.94 Unlike the chaotic regime they replaced, the Federal Rules were trans-substantive and uniform.95 They
governed all cases in federal courts without regard to the causes of
action or the amount at issue.96 In addition, whereas procedural arcana was once the order of the day, the new national regime was a
triumph of minimalism. The Federal Rules abolished single issue
pleading, authorized expansive discovery, and permitted easy joinder
of parties.97 Finally, the Federal Rules went out of their way to give
courts discretion.98 Borrowing heavily from equity practice, they
armed judges with the power “to do what was right.”99
However, the Federal Rules were not Congress’s first attempt at
procedural reform in the early twentieth century. In 1925, Congress
had taken a step toward addressing the widespread dissatisfaction
with the judicial system by passing the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).100 Arbitration was not new: members of chambers of commerce and trade associations had long avoided the swamp of the judicial system by submitting disputes to prominent businesspeople, who
resolved them by applying customs, rather than legal rules.101 But outside of these insular communities, the common law stunted arbitration’s growth. Under the ancient ouster and revocability doctrines,

94. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934); 28 U.S.C. § 723.
95. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 394–99 (2010) (explaining why reformers
were drawn to the principle of trans-substantivity).
96. See id. at 376–77 (explaining that most of the Federal Rules are trans-substantive).
97. See Subrin, supra note 35, at 922–24.
98. See id. at 944 (claiming that “judges were to have discretion to do what was
right”).
99. Id.
100. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15. Today, “many plaintiffs seem to regard arbitration as the
place where ‘lawsuits go to die.’” Hawkins v. Region’s, 944 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (N.D.
Miss. 2013). Yet scholars have recently demonstrated that the FAA stemmed from a
desire to sweep away the cobwebs of ancient procedural law and facilitate access to
justice. See IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN
AMERICA 183–84 (2013) (explaining that the enactment of the FAA was to minimize the
delay in attending trials); Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural
Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1943–53 (2014) (stating that the FAA was designed to
promote access to the judicial system).
101. See KELLOR, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that arbitration occurred in chambers
of commerce along the eastern seaboard as early as the late eighteenth century); Phillips, supra note 82, at 590 (noting that for many years “guilds required their members
to submit disputes to the guild tribunals before they could go to court”).
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judges refused to uphold pre-dispute contracts to arbitrate.102 The
FAA abolished these anti-arbitration rules through its centerpiece,
section 2, which makes arbitration clauses specifically enforceable,
subject to generally-applicable contract principles, such as fraud or
duress.103 By doing so, Congress sought to encourage access to “an alternative forum” that was characterized by “simplicity, flexibility, and
intolerance of technicalities.”104
Although the FAA overruled centuries of law, it was relatively
threadbare. The statute governed the periods before and after the arbitration. For example, sections 3 and 4 entrusted courts with deciding arbitrability: the threshold issue of whether a dispute fell within
the scope of a valid arbitration agreement.105 Likewise, section 10 permitted courts to overturn awards for egregious errors, such as when
an arbitrator “exceeded [his or her] powers” or displayed “evident
partiality.”106 Yet the FAA did not address the nuts and bolts of the arbitral process itself.107
This was not surprising, because complex procedural rules in arbitration would have been jarring. Traditionally, private dispute resolution was casual and improvisational: parties “appoint[ed] arbitrators and le[ft] them to blunder along . . . without procedural
guidance.”108 To be sure, some trade associations and merchant
groups created charters and bylaws to govern their conflict resolution
regimes.109 Nevertheless, these were mere sketches of procedural
rules. For example, the New York Chamber of Commerce’s arbitration
102. See Kill v. Hollister (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (KB) (“[T]he agreement of the
parties cannot oust this [c]ourt.”); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 599 (KB)
(explaining that arbitration agreements were “of [their] own nature countermandable”).
103. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (making arbitration clauses in contracts that affect interstate
commerce “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract”); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (noting
that the FAA tried to abolish ancient judicial hostility to arbitration).
104. Aragaki, supra note 100, at 1943.
105. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4.
106. Id. § 10(a)(2), (4).
107. See Braden, supra note 70, at 190 (noting that the FAA was “enabling and not
regulatory legislation”). There are two quasi-exceptions: section 5 of the statute governs some issues related to the appointment of the arbitrator, and section 7 allows
arbitrators to compel witnesses to attend hearings and to produce documents. 9 U.S.C.
§§ 5, 7.
108. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 24; Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 857 (1961) (explaining that, in trade associations, “the norms and
standards of the group itself are being brought to bear by the arbitrators”).
109. Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration—Instrument of Private Government,
54 YALE L.J. 36, 42 n.24 (1944).
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code spanned a grand total of three pages and included vacuous statements like “cases . . . shall be pressed to speedy termination” and “[a]ll
irrelevant or unimportant matters shall be excluded.”110 Thus, the
norm was that “in arbitration proceedings[,] ‘anything goes.’”111
But in 1927, the AAA—a non-profit entity that administered arbitrations—unveiled a fundamentally different blueprint.112 The AAA
sought to create a system of “organized arbitration” in which disputes
marched methodically “under uniform rules of procedure.”113 To that
end, the institution created seventeen Arbitration Rules that followed
“the basic structure of an adversarial trial.”114 They allowed parties to
file pleadings115 and briefs,116 to obtain transcriptions of hearings,117
and to request a written award.118
Three aspects of the original Arbitration Rules are especially relevant for my purposes. First, the AAA imposed discipline on its dispute
resolution machinery to try to insulate arbitration from judicial review. As Frances Kellor, a founder and vice president of the AAA, observed, “[t]he old practice of avoiding rules of procedure [had] result[ed] in loopholes through which the courts could upset awards.”119
Thus, by promulgating Arbitration Rules, the AAA “avoid[ed] duplication, conflict, or confusion as to what each participant should do in
processing a case” and maximized the odds that “both the arbitration
agreement and the award” would be “found to be legally valid and enforceable.”120 This strategy proved successful. In 1931, the

110. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK III, IV, reprinted in JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW
288–90 (1918).
111. Kallus v. Ideal Novelty & Toy Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 554, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
112. Two professors, Philip G. Phillips and Walter J. Derenberg, apparently helped
write the Rules. See KELLOR, supra note 71, at 76 n.1. Although the AAA adopted the
Rules in 1927, see id., the Rules became more prominent in 1931, when the institution
published them at the end of a popular treatise. CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at
187–95.
113. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 22–23.
114. Kessler, supra note 84, at 2987.
115. CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 188.
116. Id. at 192.
117. See id. at 190 (describing how the clerk shall make arrangements to record
the testimony).
118. Id. at 193.
119. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 24.
120. Id. at 64–65.
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organization boasted that courts had upheld more than 99% of
awards generated under its code.121
Second, the AAA took a key step to propagate its singular vision
of arbitration. AAA Rule XVI declared that parties who chose the institution to administer a case “shall be deemed to have made these Rules
a part of the arbitration agreement.”122 Thus, anyone who signed a
contract that mandated arbitration in the AAA incorporated the Arbitration Rules by reference and became bound by them.123 To be sure,
nothing prevented parties from drafting around the Arbitration Rules.
But because this required spending extra time and money, the Arbitration Rules proved to be “sticky,” and they governed nearly every
dispute on the AAA’s docket.124
Third, even though the Arbitration Rules made arbitration more
akin to litigation, they were also more progressive than court procedures at that time. In fact, in several ways, the AAA anticipated the sea
change of the Federal Rules, which did not appear for another eleven
years. For one, the Arbitration Rules were trans-substantive and uniform. Indeed, as the AAA boasted, its code “may be used in any type of
controversy” and is “adaptable to any jurisdiction in the United
States.”125 Likewise, the Arbitration Rules abandoned the common
law’s onerous tradition of single-issue pleading. Years before Federal
Rule 8 relaxed pleading standards,126 AAA Rule II merely required the
claimant to file “a brief statement of the controversy” and the respondent to lodge “a brief answer.”127 And lastly, like the Federal Rules, the
Arbitration Rules gave the decision-maker wide leeway to define the
parameters of the hearing.128

121. Id. at 65 n.1; see Kessler, supra note 84, at 2990 (relating the original Arbitration Rules to a broader movement in which “the legal elites responsible for running
the AAA” gave themselves “substantial, discretionary power to craft the pre-constituted package of procedures [that] they deemed best”).
122. CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 195.
123. Samson v. Bergin, 17 Conn. Supp. 127, 127 (C.P. 1950).
124. Cf. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 64–65 (“Whatever may be lost in freedom of action is more than compensated for by the assurance that both the arbitration agreement and the award, when processed under Rules, are generally found to be legally
valid and enforceable.”).
125. CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 1.
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief”).
127. CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at 188.
128. See id. at 190–92 (empowering the arbitrator to set the location and time of
the hearing, control who attended, and decide what weight to afford evidence).

636

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:619

In sum, the AAA’s initial Arbitration Rules made organized arbitration a viable alternative to the court system. As the Article discusses next, this model would soon dominate a booming industry.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARBITRATION RULES
In the second half of the twentieth century, arbitration changed
dramatically. The Court expanded the FAA, forced arbitration provisions became common, and new providers challenged the AAA for
market share. This section explains how these developments caused
the Arbitration Rules to supplant state-supplied procedures on a massive scale.
Soon after the Federal Rules appeared, the AAA revised its Arbitration Rules. To distinguish itself from the newly-streamlined procedures available in court, the institution abandoned its one-size-fits-all
aspiration and adopted specialized principles for commercial, tort,
and labor disputes.129 Although the differences between these Rules
were minor,130 they highlighted one of arbitration’s advantages: in
court, procedure was relatively static, but in arbitration, it was elastic.
In addition, the AAA elaborated upon its original code, increasing
the number of Arbitration Rules to fifty-two by the 1940s.131 Despite
these embellishments, the core goal remained the same: to generate
awards that withstood judicial review. For example, to dispel any confusion about the vast breadth of arbitrators’ powers, Rules 24 and 25
of the AAA’s Accident Claims Tribunal permitted arbitrators to ignore
the “legal rules of evidence” and make up their own minds concerning
“the relevancy and materiality” of any offer of proof.132 Likewise, AAA
Commercial Rule 42 authorized arbitrators to confer any “relief which
[they] deem[] just and equitable and within the scope of the

129. See Merger Fabrics, Inc. v. Coill-Shuman Co., 74 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77 (Sup. Ct. 1947)
(referring to the AAA’s Commercial Rules); Frantz v. Inter-Ins. Exch. of the Auto. Club
of S. Cal., 40 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222 (Ct. App. 1964) (mentioning the AAA’s Accident Claims
Tribunal Rules); Cemetery Stone Handlers, Erectors & Granite Yard Helpers, Loc. No.
106 v. Palumbo, 130 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (featuring a contract that incorporated the AAA’s Labor Rules).
130. See KELLOR, supra note 71, at 219–30 (listing the Commercial Rules and using
footnotes to point out the few places where the Labor Rules diverged); Geo. Savage
King, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Claims, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 328, 345 (1962) (noting that the AAA’s tort rules made “little change” to the commercial rules).
131. See KELLOR, supra note 71, at 219–30.
132. Atlas Floor Covering v. Crescent House & Garden, Inc., 333 P.2d 194, 199 (Ct.
App. 1958); Milliken Woolens, Inc. v. Weber Knit Sportswear, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 408,
411–12 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev’d, 202 N.Y.S.2d 431 (App. Div. 1960), aff’d, 175 N.E.2d 826
(N.Y. 1961).
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agreement of the parties.”133 This meant that arbitrators could
properly bestow remedies that courts “would not grant.”134
As the decades marched on, arbitration became firmly rooted in
the legal system, and new providers emerged with their own spins on
organized arbitration. For instance, in 1979, a consortium of corporations and law firms founded the Center for Public Resources (CPR) Institute for Dispute Resolution.135 CPR was geared for cross-border disputes between big businesses, and thus featured three-arbitrator
panels, evidentiary privileges, and reasoned awards.136 A year later,
former trial judge H. Warren Knight founded Judicial Arbitration &
Mediation Services (JAMS).137 Unlike the AAA and CPR, which were
non-profit, JAMS operated “like a for-profit law firm,” with its arbitrators, like partners, holding equity stakes in the company.138 JAMS was
to domestic arbitration what CPR was to international arbitration: it
held itself out as the destination of choice for complex, high-stakes
matters. JAMS’ default code, the Comprehensive Rules, contained procedures that emulated the Federal Rules, including “extensive . . . discovery[]” and summary judgment motions that were to be decided under the “same burdens as a court in the jurisdiction would apply under
similar circumstances.”139 Thus, if the AAA offered “litigation lite,”140
JAMS came close to selling private litigation.

133. Saucy Susan Prods., Inc. v. Allied Old Eng., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 724, 729 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Sapp v. Barenfeld, 212 P.2d 233, 239 (Cal. 1949) (noting that incorporating the AAA’s Rules permitted the arbitrators to “base their decision upon broad
principles of justice and equity, and . . . expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party
might successfully have asserted in a judicial action”).
134. Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 172 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff’d, 180
N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1958), aff’d, 160 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1959). Likewise, to limit the
paper trail available to parties seeking to vacate awards in court, the AAA “put[] enormous pressure on its arbitrators not to write opinions but to merely state the award
in dollar amounts.” Mentschikoff, supra note 108, at 857.
135. Sabatino, supra note 70, at 1301–02.
136. See Tom Arnold & Dan Hubert, Spreadsheet Comparison of Various Arbitration
Rules, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE STUDY, ARB., MEDIATION, & OTHER ADR METHODS, NOV. 18,
1993, at 287, 289 (1993).
137. E.g., Anne S. Kim, Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 166,
173–74 (1994).
138. Reply Brief of Appellant at *8 n.10, City Beverages, L.L.C. v. Monster Energy
Co., No. 17-55813, 2018 WL 4222941 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2018); Stewart & Assocs. Int’l,
Inc. v. Quixtar Inc., No. 05-3440-CV-S-RED, 2006 WL 8438384, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20,
2006) (“JAMS is a private, for-profit corporation in which all of its neutrals are also
shareholders in the corporation.”).
139. Sabatino, supra note 70, at 1315, 1324.
140. Id.
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Then, in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a flurry of opinions that transformed arbitration “from the role of commercial court
to that of a civil court of general jurisdiction.”141 For starters, although
Congress intended the FAA primarily to govern fact-bound breach-ofcontract allegations,142 the Justices sent complex antitrust and employment discrimination claims into the private forum.143 The Court
justified this result by opining that the shift between litigation and arbitration did not affect the ultimate outcome of a case:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.144

Similarly, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court held that section
2 of the FAA—which, as noted, makes arbitration agreements specifically enforceable145—applies in state court and preempts state law.146
After Southland, state legislatures and courts applying contract rules
could neither “prohibit[ ] outright the arbitration of a particular type
of claim” nor “promot[e] procedures incompatible with arbitration.”147 Banks, credit card issuers, employers, hospitals, and schools
added arbitration clauses to their fine print.148
The Court’s FAA jurisprudence sparked heated debate. Businesses and their allies defended forced arbitration as fast and inexpensive.149 However, other scholars, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and public
141. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
142. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926) (calling arbitration “peculiarly suited to the disposition
of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact”).
143. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985) (compelling arbitration of Sherman Act claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1991) (ordering arbitration of alleged violations
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
144. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
145. See supra text accompanying note 103.
146. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (finding that the FAA prohibited state law from “undercut[ting] the enforceability of [an] arbitration agreement”).
147. Prima Donna Dev. Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 187
(Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotations marks omitted) (citing AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011)); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., L.L.C., 173 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 289, 327 (2014).
148. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers,
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997).
149. See, e.g., David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water,
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interest organizations objected that arbitration “strip[s] people of
their rights”150 and “systematically reduces the legal liability of corporate defendants.”151 Some courts shared these concerns, and invoked
the unconscionability doctrine to strike down arbitration agreements
that slashed discovery,152 shifted costs to the plaintiff,153 barred the
award of certain remedies,154 and chose inconvenient locations for the
hearing.155
This controversy left a deep imprint on the Arbitration Rules. In
the late 1990s, an independent Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution identified a series of procedural safeguards that were necessary to “provid[e] due process” in mandatory employment arbitration,
including the rights to adequate discovery and an impartial decisionmaker.156 Providers displayed little interest in these recommendations.157 But then the powerful National Employment Lawyers Association threatened to boycott the AAA and JAMS.158 As an olive branch,
both institutions adopted the Task Force’s proposals in the form of
“Due Process Protocol” (in the AAA)159 and “Minimum Standards” (in

and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 105 (1999)
(“[A]rbitration provide[s] the parties with an inexpensive, confidential, and fast resolution.”).
150. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 401; Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 782–83 (2002) (“[W]hatever the rules of law may
be, arbitrators are not bound to follow them, and their handiwork is subject to only the
most perfunctory of judicial oversight.”).
151. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 37.
152. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 277 (Ct. App. 2003).
154. Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 671 (S.C. 2007).
155. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1285–86 (9th Cir. 2006).
156. AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 1 (1995), https://www
.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Due%
20Process%20Protocol_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCZ4-8FJ5] (offering suggestions for
forced employment arbitration); JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 149–67 (1997) (providing further suggestions
for forced employment arbitration).
157. See Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1996, at 58, 58–59 (explaining how this prompted a number of organizations to
agree on “due process protocols”).
158. Id.
159. AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1
(1998), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%
20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/RY3Z-3Z8X]; AM. ARB.
ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1995), https://www.adr.org/sites/
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JAMS).160 Both organizations announced that they would refuse to administer forced arbitrations unless the underlying arbitration provision complied with these norms.161 In addition, they wove these principles into special Arbitration Rules.162 Among other things, these
progressive procedural codes open the courthouse door—or, more
accurately, the conference room door—by requiring businesses to
subsidize plaintiffs’ claims. In consumer cases, the AAA’s filing and administrative costs range up to $2,200, but individuals only pay $200
of this sum.163 Likewise, although JAMS’ Comprehensive Rules prescribe a $1,750 filing fee in two-party matters,164 its Employment
Rules shift this expense to firms that mandate arbitration “as a
default/files/document_repository/Employment%20Due%20Process%20Protocol_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCZ4-8FJ5].
160. JAMS, CONSUMER ARBITRATION MINIMUM STANDARDS (2009), https://www
.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds
-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED9X-4BZE]; JAMS, POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/
Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-2009.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BN87-YJX6].
161. See, e.g., Employment Arbitration under AAA Administration, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/employment [https://perma.cc/KD5B-JBRF] (“The AAA will accept a case for administration only after the AAA reviews the parties’ arbitration agreement and if the AAA determines that the agreement substantially and materially complies with the due process standards of the Rules and the Employment Due Process
Protocol.”). In addition, the AAA’s efforts to create a Due Process Protocol for
healthcare arbitrations led to the institution refusing to handle such cases when they
stem from a pre-dispute arbitration clause. AM. ARB. ASS’N, AAA HEALTHCARE POLICY
STATEMENT (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/
AAA_Healthcare_Policy_Statement_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX6P-FUUU]. For more
on the Protocols, including empirical evidence that the AAA honors its commitment to
reject cases that do not comply with its standards, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 301–
52 (2012).
162. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES (2014) [hereinafter AAA
CONSUMER RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XV8-QAW8]; AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2007) [hereinafter AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES], https://www
.adr.org/sites/default/files/employment_arbitration_rules_and_mediation_
procedures_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WX9-HL9C]; Streamlined Arbitration Rules &
Procedures, JAMS (2014) [hereinafter JAMS Streamlined Rules], https://www.jamsadr
.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration [https://perma.cc/WG2M-84UE]; Employment
Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JAMS (2014) [hereinafter JAMS Employment Rules],
https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/english#fifteen [https://
perma.cc/6BK4-F7PB].
163. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at 33.
164. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54, at 17; Arbitration Schedule of Fees
and Costs, JAMS (2020), https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-fees [https://perma
.cc/VPX2-KTT9].
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condition of employment.”165 Eventually, other providers, such as CPR
and NAM, adopted their own versions of these principles.166
Providers soon found that self-regulation had a silver lining. Recall that since the early days of the AAA, administrators have touted
their services as a way to minimize the danger of courts invalidating
arbitration agreements and awards.167
Judges gave the AAA and JAMS new ammunition for this claim by
treating the Due Process Protocols and Minimum Standards as benchmarks, citing compliance with them “as evidence that [a procedure] is
fair and enforceable.”168 Perhaps for this reason, the AAA began to
market its Rules as “court- and time-tested.”169
Recently, though, two issues have raised fresh uncertainty about
the fairness of forced arbitration. First, the Court has amplified arbitral jurisdiction at the expense of judges. As noted above, sections 3
and 4 of the FAA entrust courts with deciding “arbitrability”: threshold questions about whether arbitration should proceed, such as
whether an arbitration clause is valid or broad enough to cover a particular cause of action.170 Yet in First Options v. Kaplan, the Court
opined that parties can reverse this default rule and assign arbitrability to the arbitrator if “there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence”
that they intended to do so.171 To eliminate judicial review of their
contracts, firms began to give arbitrators the “exclusive authority to
resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this [arbitration clause].”172 In a 2010
165. JAMS EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 162, at r. 31(c).
166. Employment Dispute Arbitration Procedure, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT
PREVENTION & RESOL. (2020), https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/
arbitration/employment-arbitration-procedure [https://perma.cc/4AQP-LLZG];
NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, NAM’S MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR
CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS (2009), https://www.namadr.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/07/Consumer-MinimumStandards.pdf [https://perma.cc/74JK-2F5H].
167. See supra text accompanying notes 119–21.
168. Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165, 179–
80 (2005); see also Shoals v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., No. 2:18-CV-2355, 2018 WL
5761764, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018) (“Most courts have found that the JAMS rules
provide for adequate discovery.”).
169. What We Do, supra note 46.
170. See supra text accompanying note 105; AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (“[T]he question of arbitrability . . . is undeniably
an issue for judicial determination . . . .”).
171. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T
Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649).
172. Anderson v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. C 04-4808 SBA, 2005 WL 1048700, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 4, 2005).
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decision called Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court held that
these so-called “delegation clauses” even permit the arbitrator to decide whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable.173
Second, the Court encouraged companies to use arbitration
clauses to deter class actions. About two decades ago, corporations
began experimenting with class arbitration waivers, which mandate
that plaintiffs arbitrate on an individual basis.174 Yet a chorus of courts
held that these provisions were unconscionable when applied to
plaintiffs who alleged that a business had deprived them of a small
amount of money.175 These judges reasoned that because no consumer or employee would incur the time, energy, and money to pursue low-dollar complaints, class arbitration waivers function as exculpatory clauses.176 Nevertheless, in 2011’s AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, the Justices held that the FAA forbids courts from finding
class arbitration waivers to be unconscionable.177 The Court opined
that Congress passed the statute “to facilitate streamlined proceedings”178 and that class arbitration is too slow and procedurally formal
to be compatible with this goal.179 Gradually, the Justices built on Concepcion’s foundation,180 eventually concluding in 2019’s Lamps Plus v.

173. Rent-A-Center., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 n.1 (2010).
174. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight,
As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2000).
175. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Georgia law); Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1285–90 (D. Ariz.
2007); Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); Powertel, Inc.
v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC,
857 N.E.2d 250, 274–75 (Ill. 2006); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 22–
23 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); Fiser v. Dell Comput. Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008);
Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006–08 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
176. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108.
177. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
178. Id. at 344.
179. See id. at 347–49.
180. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rests., 570 U.S. 228, 235–38 (2013) (extending Concepcion, which involved state unconscionability principles, to a similar federal common law doctrine known as the “effective vindication” rule); Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (overruling the National Labor Relations Board’s
determination that class arbitration waivers in employment contracts violate the National Labor Relations Act).
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Varela that the mere existence of an arbitration clause is a class action
ban.181
The Court’s decades of infatuation with the FAA have made the
Arbitration Rules more important than ever. Not surprisingly, studies
have found forced arbitration clauses in hundreds of millions of consumer and employment contracts.182 More for-profit providers have
opened their doors, including ADR Services, Inc., ARC, NAM, JW, and
USA&M.183 Each of these companies have created signature Arbitration Rules for the thousands of organized arbitrations they handle
each year.184 The next Part takes a closer look at these private procedural codes.
II. CRITIQUING THE ARBITRATION RULES
Courts and commentators often describe arbitration as sacrificing the regimented procedures of the judicial system for a forum that
is “simpl[e], informal[], and expedi[ent].”185 But there is a more concrete way to understand this tradeoff. Because of the prominence of
organized arbitration, being compelled to arbitrate usually means
transitioning from one set of fixed procedures to another. This Part
helps us understand what parties gain and lose from private dispute
resolution by contrasting the Federal Rules and the Arbitration Rules.
A. PROCEDURES FOR CREATING PROCEDURE
The differences between the Federal Rules and the Arbitration
Rules start with how they are created. The dominant method of promulgating the Federal Rules—court rulemaking—invites public input
and is subject to congressional oversight.186 As this section explains,

181. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019) (precluding courts
from interpreting arbitration clauses that do not mention class actions as authorizing
such proceedings).
182. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
STUDY FINDS THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS LIMIT RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS (2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7J8P-XYM8]; Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory
Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the
-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for
-more-than-60-million-american-workers [https://perma.cc/V6Z6-MY6T].
183. See supra text accompanying notes 45–53.
184. See supra text accompanying note 54.
185. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
186. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2074(a).
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most Arbitration Rules stem from processes that are neither inclusive
nor susceptible to meaningful state control.
The overwhelming majority of the Federal Rules arise from court
rulemaking.187 Rather than drafting procedures itself, Congress has
delegated the task to the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling
Act.188 The Court gives the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules—an
elite group of judges, lawyers, and law professors—the first crack at
crafting the Federal Rules.189 The Reporter of the Advisory Committee
prepares drafts of new rules or amendments and “‘Committee Notes’
explaining their purpose or intent.”190 If the Advisory Committee approves of a proposal, it goes up the ladder to three more groups of experts, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, and, finally, the Court.191 If the
Justices approve of the suggested Federal Rules, they become law unless Congress vetoes them within seven months.192
Court rulemaking is no stranger to controversy. In the late 1970s,
a parade of commentators argued that the process needed to be more
open:
[The] rules [are] drafted by a committee of private citizens and judges
acting in an advisory capacity, which operates for the most part in private;
approved by a body of judges, meeting entirely in private; promulgated by
the Supreme Court without any real expectation, or the procedure to warrant
that expectation, of focused consideration of constitutional or statutory questions; and “approved” by the legislature through simple inaction . . . .193

To assuage these concerns, Congress overhauled court rulemaking in 1988.194 It adopted a notice-and-comment rubric like the one
employed by federal agencies, ensuring “broad public participation by
requiring public hearings, open meetings, publicly available minutes,
187. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22
TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 328–31 (1991).
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a).
189. See How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. CTS. [hereinafter Rulemaking Process], https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how
-rulemaking-process-works [https://perma.cc/GB3T-87Z9]; Committee Membership
Selection, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection [https://perma.cc/CE54-7HTA].
190. Baker, supra note 187, at 329.
191. See Rulemaking Process, supra note 189.
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
193. Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: Time for Re-examination,
61 A.B.A. J. 579, 582 (1975); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 907–08 (1976) (noting ways in which court
rulemaking seems more legislative than judicial).
194. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act § 401(c), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073(c).

2020]

ARBITRATION RULES

645

and longer periods for public commentary.”195 For example, before
the Advisory Committee amended the discovery rules in 2015, it
heard testimony from 120 witnesses and received 2,300 written comments.196 This new model is largely “seen as more democratic and
more accountable than the work of cloistered experts.”197 But it also
has a downside. Interest groups have seized the chance to make their
voices head and swamped the Committees with opinions.198 As a result, “[e]ven ordinary rule changes typically t[a]k[e] three years or
more.”199
The process of creating the Arbitration Rules is nothing like court
rulemaking. For one, providers do not even disclose how they decide
to change their codes or what they do to vet these revisions. Thus, the
manner of making the Arbitration Rules is as much of a black box as
arbitration itself. In fact, it is often hard to tell whether an organization
has amended its code. Although the AAA and ADR Services collect archived versions of older Rules200—and JAMS goes further by releasing
a memorandum explaining recent amendments201—other providers
simply post the latest version of their procedures on their websites.202
These Arbitration Rules materialize with no explanation or fanfare.
Also, unlike the Advisory Committee, providers establish procedures by fiat. They neither publish their proposals, solicit input, hold
hearings, nor submit to regulatory review. To be sure, there are exceptions: the AAA’s and JAMS’s Rules for forced arbitrations originated with a task force that included members from groups like the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Bar Association, and the
195. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 903 (1999).
196. John J. Jablonski & Alexander R. Dahl, The 2015 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Guide to Proportionality in Discovery and Implementing a Safe
Harbor for Preservation, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 411, 412 (2015).
197. Jordan M. Singer, The Federal Courts’ Rulemaking Buffer, 60 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2239, 2294 (2019).
198. See id. at 2299–3000.
199. Id. at 2298.
200. See Rules, Forms, Fees, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/ArchiveRules
[https://perma.cc/E573-RVXK]; Arbitration Rules, ADR SERVS., INC., https://www.
adrservices.com/services/arbitration-rules [https://perma.cc/DAD9-2QXG].
201. See Summary of Revisions to Employment Arbitration Rules, JAMS, http://
jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/2014-Summary-of
-Employment-Rules-Changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE7S-GB5M].
202. See, e.g., Rules, Fees and Forms, NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, https://www
.namadr.com/resources/rules-fees-forms [https://perma.cc/D95G-KC84]; JW Commercial Rules, supra note 54; USA&M Rules of Arbitration, U.S. ARB. & MEDIATION,
https://usam.com/rules-of-arbitration [https://perma.cc/9SKK-4X3R].
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National Academy of Arbitrators.203 However, this faint echo of noticeand-comment rulemaking was a one-time occurrence: the AAA and
JAMS do not consult stakeholders every time they update their
code.204 Therefore, while the Federal Rules are built on compromise,
the Arbitration Rules reflect the undiluted vision of each provider.
Whether readers find this troubling probably depends on what
they think about privatization. The opacity of arbitration rulemaking
will be most alarming to those who subscribe to the “[g]overnance
[c]ritique” of forced arbitration.205 Scholars like J. Maria Glover,206
Margaret Jane Radin,207 and myself (a decade ago)208 have argued that
the Court’s aggrandizement of the FAA degrades our democracy. Seen
through this lens, companies use arbitration clauses to erase entitlements that were created by elected representatives. For example,
though class arbitration waivers, businesses can delete legislation
that permits consumers and employees to assert small claims.209 To
be sure, people “consent” to these rights-stripping provisions by clicking “I agree” or signing on the dotted line. Yet because nobody reads
the fine print, and because a single firm’s terms and conditions can
bind hundreds of millions of people, these “contracts” actually operate
as private statutes.210 Thus, the theory concludes, corporations harness arbitration to engage in private lawmaking.
203. See Harding, supra note 70, at 390; Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 69, at
1133 (noting that because the Due Process protocols and Minimum Standards were
“hammered out through dialogue between the industry and advocates for employees
and consumers, they arguably offer a relatively balanced metric rather than a biased
one”). But see Green, supra note 70, at 215 (criticizing these measures for failing to
include “representatives from many of the very classes of individuals the civil rights
statutes were erected to protect”).
204. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 69, at 1133 n.91.
205. David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1006–09 (2017).
206. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3052 (2015) (“Through private arbitration contracts, private parties can effectively rewrite substantive law by rendering a host of legal claims mere
nullities.”).
207. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 33 (2013) (asserting that the widespread use of standard form contracts replaces state-created law “with a governance
scheme that is more favorable to the firm”).
208. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 483–84 (2011)
(arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the FAA permits the drafters of arbitration
clauses to rewrite the Federal Rules and thus alter substantive outcomes).
209. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 206, at 3057 (“Through the procedural device of
private arbitration, private parties have the quasi-lawmaking power to write substantive law largely off the books by precluding or severely impeding the assertion of various civil claims.”).
210. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 208, at 487–89.
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To governance critics, the Arbitration Rules are further proof of
this legitimacy gap. According to their logic, because procedure impacts substance, procedural rulemaking needs to tethered to the will
of the people.211 Indeed, that is why the Rules Enabling Act establishes
checks on the unelected Federal Rules Committees, such as the noticeand-comment period and the specter of congressional disapproval.
However, thanks to the Court’s infatuation with the FAA, providers
have been able to end-run these safeguards and design procedures in
an impenetrable bubble. And again, the mechanism that supposedly
justifies this result—assent—is a charade. Even putting the flimsiness
of consent to arbitration to one side, the idea that any one truly consents to specific Arbitration Rules is beyond the pale. As noted, these
principles do not even appear on the face of the contract; rather, they
are incorporated through fleeting reference to the “ADR Services’
[A]rbitration [R]ules,”212 “the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association”213 or the “JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration
Rules and Procedures.”214 Therefore, the Arbitration Rules are yet another way in which we have allowed private parties to wield public
power.
But commentators who are less starry-eyed about state control
would argue that there are benefits to cutting the red tape of court
rulemaking. As Stephen Yeazell has quipped, “[i]t requires more steps
to amend a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure than it does to amend the
U.S. Constitution.”215 Compared to this lumbering elephant, the process of drafting private procedures is exceedingly nimble. Indeed, as
Christopher Drahozal and Peter “Bo” Rutledge have observed, because

211. But see Bone, supra note 195, at 909 (questioning this reasoning because “if
outcome effects alone were sufficient to trigger concern [about democratic legitimacy],
then all state decisions would have to be made by processes styled on legislation, even
those decisions belonging to the common law”).
212. GAC Int’l, LLC v. Roth Licensing, LLC, No. 15-CV-2375, 2019 WL 174972, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2019).
213. Valley Tool & Die, Inc. v. Fastenal Co., No. 1:18CV2682, 2019 WL 548597, at
*3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2019).
214. Parada v. Superior Ct., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 750 (Ct. App. 2009). Other companies select a provider’s Arbitration Rules without specifying which ones. See, e.g.,
Terms of Use, HEDGES HEALTHMART PHARMACY, https://www.hedgespharmacy.com/
terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/85T4-XMVV] (designating the “rules of the American
Arbitration Association which are in effect on the date a dispute is submitted to the
American Arbitration Association”).
215. Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
229, 235 (1998).
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providers can freely alter Arbitration Rules, these principles are “easily changed and adapted to evolving circumstances.”216
Similarly, privatization proponents might challenge the claim
that providers enjoy freedom from governmental oversight. Over the
decades, courts have left an imprint on the Arbitration Rules by reviewing arbitration clauses and awards. For example, arbitration traditionally featured “little or no discovery.”217 However, in Armendariz
v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Supreme
Court held that employees were “entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim[s], including access to essential documents and witnesses.”218 After Armendariz, most arbitration
administrators began setting discovery floors in certain cases.219 Likewise, when the AAA adopted its Due Process Protocols, its initial Employment Rules said “[n]othing [about] . . . how an arbitrator’s compensation is to be allocated.”220 But then the D.C. Circuit filled this
vacuum by holding that “an arbitrator’s compensation and expenses
must be paid by the employer alone.”221 In these ways, judges keep
providers in line.222

216. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 69, at 1132.
217. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 8.
218. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684 (Cal.
2000). Under Armendariz, although “[d]iscovery as broad as that provided in court is
not required,” plaintiffs still must be able to “vindicate their public rights.” Shoals v.
Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., No. 2:18-CV-2355, 2018 WL 5761764, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
31, 2018).
219. See infra text accompanying notes 264.
220. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
221. Id.; see also Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235
(10th Cir. 1999) (“We reject a presumption that arbitrators will be unable to perform
in a competent and impartial manner if one party pays the bill.”). Today, most providers embrace this “employer pays” policy for forced arbitrations. See Employment/
Workplace Fee Schedule, AM. ARB. ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.adr.org/sites/
default/files/Employment_Fee_Schedule1Nov19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UG8NVUQ];
JAMS Employment Rules, supra note 162, at r. 31(c).
222. But then again, judicial review is almost certainly less effective than oversight
by elected officials or their proxies. For example, in securities arbitration, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, which was once known as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)) must clear its Arbitration Rules with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). See Stipanowich, supra note 141, at 4. This layer of
state supervision proved to be important in 1996, when the NASD proposed a new
Arbitration Rule that limited its customers’ ability to win punitive damages against
brokerages. See id. The SEC was inundated with complaints and torpedoed the Rule.
See Richard Karp, Stalled, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 1998, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB889832241816388500 [https://perma.cc/GVX9-Z5W7].
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Ultimately, members of both camps would likely agree that a key
question is whether private procedural rulemaking has triggered a
race to the bottom. After all, the Federal Rules Committees must try to
harmonize various perspectives and find the common good, but providers have financial incentives to appease the corporations that drive
the market for organized arbitration. So as a practical matter, do arbitration administrators draft procedures that favor businesses?
The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, some providers have
bowed to the wishes of their primary clientele. The most infamous example is the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). The NAF was once the
largest administrator of debt collection arbitrations in the country,
handling over 200,000 such cases each year.223 It achieved this status
by creating Arbitration Rules that were hostile to consumers. For instance, NAF Rule 29(c) only allowed discovery when its cost was justified by the amount of the claim.224 This policy effectively barred any
pre-hearing information exchanges, because parties in debt collection
matters rarely seek relief for more than a few hundred dollars. Likewise, before cases like Concepcion made class arbitration waivers bulletproof, NAF Rule 19 required any consumer who wished to represent a class to obtain the consent of all prospective plaintiffs and
submit copies of their arbitration agreements.225 This was rarely possible, as “all such pertinent data was within [the defendant’s] exclusive
possession.”226 As it turned out, this pro-business tilt was no coincidence: the Minnesota Attorney General eventually discovered that the
NAF had financial ties to New York hedge funds that also owned a major debt collector.227
Likewise, in 2004, JAMS announced that it would no longer enforce class arbitration waivers.228 However, JAMS’s regular “corporate
users were . . . furious” and “made clear that there were other
223. See Press Release, Minn. Off. of the Att’y Gen., National Arbitration Forum
Barred from Credit Card and Consumer Arbitrations Under Agreement with Attorney
General Swanson (July 19, 2009) [hereinafter NAF Press Release], https://pubcit
.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6JT-38CE].
224. See Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 93 n.1 (N.J.
2006) (noting that the provider “allows mandatory discovery where the ‘cost [of discovery] is commensurate with the amount of the [c]laim’”).
225. See Betts v. FastFunding The Co., Inc., 60 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
226. Id.
227. See NAF Press Release, supra note 223, at 1. The state attorney general sued,
and NAF entered into a consent decree in which it promised to stop arbitrating debt
collection matters. Id.
228. See Kelly Thompson Cochran & Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer
Arbitration, 60 BUS. LAW. 785, 793–94 (2005).
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alternative forums.”229 These threats had their intended effect: shortly
after unveiling the policy, JAMS abandoned it.230
Yet on the other hand, providers’ and firms’ motivations may not
be so simple. For example, corporations appear to select the AAA more
than any of its rivals.231 This would be unwise if a company’s objective
was to suppress claims: indeed, the AAA’s forced arbitration Rules are
plaintiff-friendly.232 Instead of forum shopping for procedural advantages, businesses might be drawn to the certainty that comes with
the AAA’s “court- and time-tested” code.233 As mentioned, the AAA has
long sought to create procedures that insulate its dispute resolution
machinery from judicial review.234 Arguably, then, what drafters really value is the knowledge that their clauses and awards will be upheld.235 In turn, this would mean that the market—and not interest
group input or governmental supervision—protects consumers and
employees.
In sum, for better or for worse, the Federal Rules arise from consensus, but providers create the Arbitration Rules unilaterally and in
secret. As a result, arbitration administrators are free to compete
along whatever axis they think will attract the most business. In addition, as the next section discusses, the basic layout of procedural rules
in arbitration also departs from the architecture of those in court.

229. Philip Allen Lacovara, Class Action Arbitrations: The Challenge for the Business
Community, 24 ARB. INT’L 541, 546 (2008).
230. See Cochran & Mogilnicki, supra note 228, at 794.
231. For example, a co-author and I examined forced arbitrations that were filed
between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2016, and found that the AAA handled
14,691 consumer cases and 12,641 employment cases, JAMS oversaw 2,094 consumer
disputes, 2,463 employment disputes, and 808 tort disputes, and ADR Services managed 2,037 tort matters, 1,132 employment matters, and 133 consumer matters. See
Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 32, 39, 44 (2019); see also Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note
69, at 1126 (showing data that suggested the AAA dominated samples of credit card
and franchise agreements); cf. Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S.
Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 163 (2012) (same
for executive employment agreements).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63.
233. What We Do, supra note 46.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 119–21.
235. Cf. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 69, at 1134–35 (theorizing that “[a]n arbitrator (or institution) whose awards are routinely set aside will not be in the business for long”).
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B. TRANS-SUBSTANTIVITY AND UNIFORMITY
A hallmark of the Federal Rules is that they are trans-substantive
and uniform. Indeed, as every first-year law student learns, the Federal Rules control all federal civil cases, “regardless of complexity, substantive context, or claim size.”236 But as this section explains, the Arbitration Rules break this mold.
Litigation codes are highly standardized. As noted above, procedure was once fragmented and unpredictable, and “methods of trial
available in [one] action . . . were not necessarily available in another.”237 The Federal Rules famously solved this problem by applying
across-the-board to every lawsuit in every federal court.238 This transsubstantive and uniform ideal has weathered its share of criticism, but
“still has a strong hold on rulemaking today.”239
The Arbitration Rules are starkly different. First, they flip transsubstantivity on its head. Recall that the AAA began creating sub-Rules
for particular cases in the 1940s.240 This trend has accelerated to light
speed. The AAA now offers more than a dozen bespoke codes, such as
Domain Name Disputes,241 Election Arbitration Rules,242 Employee
Benefit Plan Claims Arbitration Rules,243 Home Construction

236. Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing the Litigation Cost-and-Delay
Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57, 97 (2018).
237. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 52 (2d ed. 1979) (“Procedures and methods of trial available in an action commenced by one kind of writ
were not necessarily available in another.”); see also F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1962) (noting that, under
the ancient writ system, “methods of procedure [were] adapted to cases of different
kinds”).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
239. Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and
the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1619 (2008).
Likewise, the Federal Rules of Evidence “apply the same way in different kinds of cases
and treat different types of litigants similarly.” David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306 (1994–1995).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 131–33.
241. AM. ARB. ASS’N, AAA DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY RULES (2011),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA_Domain_Name_Disputes_
Supplementary_Rules_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8F-JWFF].
242. AM. ARB. ASS’N, ELECTION ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION (2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Election%
20Arbitration%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B97-LTTM].
243. AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN CLAIMS ARBITRATION RULES (2013),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employee%20Benefit%20Plan%
20Claims%20Arbitration%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF8N-KTVX].
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Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures,244 and Wireless Industry
Arbitration Rules.245 Likewise, JAMS boasts Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures,246 Streamlined Arbitration Rules and Procedures,247 Engineering and Construction Arbitration Rules & Procedures,248 Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures,249 and
International Arbitration Rules.250 Finally, the Forum classifies disputes as either Business-to-Business,251 Employment,252 Franchise,253
or Intellectual Property.254 NAM uses Standard Rules,255 Comprehensive Rules,256 Employment Rules257 and Realtor/Homeowner
Rules,258 and USA&M has issued addendums to its code for consumer

244. AM. ARB. ASS’N, HOME CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES (2018), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Home_Construction_
Arbitration_Rules_and_Mediation_Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/25E5-PSS9].
245. AM. ARB. ASS’N, WIRELESS INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES (2016), https://www
.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA_Wireless_Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9JB-HXDX].
246. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54.
247. JAMS STREAMLINED RULES, supra note 162.
248. JAMS, JAMS ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES
(2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_
construction_rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFE2-BG8H].
249. JAMS Employment Rules, supra note 162.
250. JAMS International Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JAMS (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.jamsadr.com/international-arbitration-rules/English [https://perma
.cc/KS9M-CRM4].
251. FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS DISPUTES,
https://www.adrforum.com/assets/resources/Arbitration/Rules/Forum.B2B_Rules
.v2.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4G-CUBD].
252. FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, https://www
.adrforum.com/assets/resources/Arbitration/Rules/Forum.Employment_Rules.v2.4
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7RC-J85M].
253. FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING FRANCHISE DISPUTES, https://www
.adrforum.com/assets/resources/Arbitration/Rules/Forum.Franchise_Rules.v2.4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5MM-UWG9].
254. FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES,
https://www.adrforum.com/assets/resources/Arbitration/Rules/Forum.IP_Rules.v2
.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4SV-ARSS].
255. NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, NAM STANDARD RULES AND PROCEDURES (2019) [hereinafter NAM STANDARD RULES], https://www.namadr.com/content/uploads/2020/
04/RULES-STANDARD.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2RJ-YEH3].
256. NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION, NAM COMPREHENSIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES AND
PROCEDURES (2019) [hereinafter NAM COMPREHENSIVE RULES], https://www
.namadr.com/content/uploads/2019/11/Comprehensive-Rules-revised-9.18.19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FD5G-SJWM].
257. NAM EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 19.
258. See NAM COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 256.
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and personal injury matters.259 I will call this menu of Rules within
providers “case type variation.”260
Second, instead of being uniform, the Arbitration Rules vary between providers. Although these codes share common threads—such
as giving arbitrators nearly unfettered discretion261—each one bears
the distinctive stamp of its drafter. For instance, in employment cases,
NAM guarantees each side three depositions,262 JAMS and JW offer
one,263 and the AAA blandly declares that the arbitrator “shall have the
authority to order such discovery . . . as [he or she] considers necessary.”264 Likewise, JAMS freely permits summary judgment motions,265 but the AAA imposes a threshold barrier: “[T]he moving party
[must] show[] substantial cause that the motion is likely to succeed
and dispose of or narrow the issues in the case.”266 Thus, cases progress in lockstep under the Federal Rules, but march to the beat of
each provider under the Arbitration Rules.
Third, because most Arbitration Rules are mere defaults, drafters
can modify them. Indeed, private dispute resolution “allows parties
the contractual freedom to tailor their procedural rules as they see
fit.”267 As a result, firms often customize the statute of limitations,268
the aegis of discovery,269 and the ability to recover attorneys’ fees.270
These made-to-order procedures override inconsistent Arbitration

259. See USA&M RULES, supra note 54, at r. 24.
260. To be sure, these mini-statutes do not single out particular claims for special
treatment. But by separating disputes into categories, they effectively achieve the same
result. For example, in the AAA, all Title VII claims trigger the Employment Rules, and
all unfair competition allegations fall under the Consumer Rules.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 169–73.
262. NAM EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 19, at r. 11(B)(ii).
263. JAMS Employment Rules, supra note 162, at r. 17; JW Commercial Rules, supra
note 54 at r. 8.B.2.
264. AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 162, at r. 9.
265. JAMS Employment Rules, supra note 162, at r. 18.
266. AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 162, at r. 27.
267. Logan S. Kotler, Comment, Reconciling Contractualized Procedure in Litigation
and Arbitration: A Textual and Policy-Based Approach, 65 EMORY L.J. 1177, 1178 (2016).
268. See, e.g., Jones v. Deja Vu, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(involving an arbitration clause with a six-month statute of limitations).
269. See, e.g., DeGroff v. MascoTech Forming Techs.-Fort Wayne, Inc., 179 F. Supp.
2d 896, 908 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (featuring an arbitration agreement that “limits discovery
to one deposition”).
270. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Nitro Lift Techs., LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1221 (E.D. Okla.
2015) (quoting a clause providing that “costs (including without limitation, reasonable
fees and expenses of counsel and experts for the Disputing Parties) . . . shall be borne
by the Disputing Party whom the decision of the arbitrator is against”).
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Rules.271 I will call this aspect of arbitration procedures “party variation.”272
This procedural plasticity has several advantages. For one, case
type variation allows providers to acknowledge that not all complaints warrant the same process. Civil procedure scholars have long
objected that trans-substantivity has become outmoded.273 According
to these critics, procedural genericism made sense in 1938, when the
federal docket consisted of straightforward tort and breach of contract disputes, but is no longer suitable in our era of civil rights statutes, class actions, and impact litigation:
271. See, e.g., Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir.
1991) (“[A]rbitration rules are incorporated only to the extent that they do not conflict
with the express provisions of the arbitration agreement.”); Tremcorp Holdings, Inc. v.
Harris, No. S. Ct. Civ. 2016-0013, 2017 WL 3082454, at *4 (V.I. July 19, 2017) (involving
parties who submitted to the arbitrator “their agreed-upon rules . . . , which were significantly modified from the AAA rules that they were based upon, with numerous
rules crossed-out or otherwise amended”); Stipanowich, supra note 70, at 433 (“As a
creature of contract, arbitration is essentially what the parties make it.”). In fact, the
Arbitration Rules themselves often invite parties to “agree on any procedures not specified in these rules.” ADR SERVICES RULES, supra note 54, at r. 1–2; JAMS Streamlined
Rules, supra note 162, at r. 2(a) (“The Parties may agree on any procedures not specified herein or in lieu of these Rules that are consistent with the applicable law and
JAMS policies.”); NAM STANDARD RULES, supra note 255, at r. 1 (“The parties are free . . .
to enter into a written agreement, at any time, to amend or modify any of NAM’s rules
for their case.”); JW Commercial Rules, supra note 54, at r. 2.A.3 (“The parties, with the
approval of the arbitrator, may establish their own arbitration rules, or modify in writing any aspect of the governing rules.”).
272. There is one exception to party variation: Rule 1 of the AAA Employment
Rules purport to make the rest of the code mandatory. See AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES,
supra note 162, at r. 1 (“If a party establishes that an adverse material inconsistency
exists between the arbitration agreement and these rules, the arbitrator shall apply
these rules.”). Unfortunately, I do not have room in this Article to address the black
swan of immutable Arbitration Rules. But I would be remiss if I did not flag the chickenand-egg dilemma that arises when an arbitration clause purports to trump any inconsistent AAA Rules. Can parties contract around the Arbitration Rule that prevents parties from contracting around the Arbitration Rules? The few courts that have addressed the issue have spoken with a single voice and “resolve[d] this conflict between
the arbitration agreement and the AAA rules in favor of the arbitration agreement.”
Brady v. Williams Cap. Grp., 878 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Div. 2009), aff’d as modified, 928
N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 2010); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 678–80 (6th
Cir. 2003) (ignoring Rule 1 because the “arbitration agreement provides that its terms
should apply if any of its provisions conflict with AAA rules”); Ontiveros v. DHL Express
(USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 486 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[B]ecause a specific provision of
the agreement, by its very terms, trumps the otherwise applicable AAA . . . rules, those
rules do not apply.”).
273. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 95, at 372. In addition, in the 1990s, Congress
enacted substance-specific procedural rules like the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See id. at 404–07.
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It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile negligence case, a hard-fought
school integration suit, and an environmental class action to restrain the
building of a pipeline are sufficiently identical to be usefully encompassed in
a single set of rules which makes virtually no distinctions among such cases
in terms of available process.274

Thus, there have been no shortage of proposals to “segregate[]
cases and assign[] them to different processing tracks either by dimension, complexity, or substance.”275
And that is what the Arbitration Rules do. For example, the general arbitrator-selection mechanism operates as follows: providers
submit a list of between five and twelve potential decision-makers to
the parties,276 who have about two weeks to strike some and rank the
others.277 But this time-consuming step may be overkill in low-stakes
cases. As a result, under the AAA Consumer Rules and in NAM matters
where the amount in controversy is less than $10,000, providers
simply appoint an arbitrator from their roster.278 Thus, the Arbitration Rules adjust the procedural dial to accommodate the nature of the
dispute.
274. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732 (1975); Marcus, supra note 95, at 372 (“The 1938 authors
likely did not foresee the asbestos leviathan, class actions with up to 100 million plaintiffs, or other enormously complicated fields of litigation that beg for specialized procedural treatment.”); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 525–26 (1986) (cataloguing ways in which federal practice has
changed in the last half-century).
275. Miller, supra note 236, at 98; Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need
for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 333–34 (2008) (“[W]e must bury, once and
for all, the thoroughly misguided idea that trans-substantivity is an independent value
or ideal for the Federal Rules.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American
Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) (arguing
that the supposed virtues of trans-substantivity are “a sham”); Resnik, supra note 274,
at 547 (“We must face that, whatever the horrors of forms of action, we need to determine what subsets of cases require special kinds of rules, and write rules for those
kinds of cases.”).
276. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. R-12(a) (ten names); JAMS Employment Rules, supra note 162, at r. 15(b) (five names); JAMS Streamlined Rules, supra
note 162, at r. 12(c) (at least three names); NAM EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 19, at
r. 7 (seven names); JW Commercial Rules, supra note 54, at r.5A.3.c (five names); cf. ARC
RULES, supra note 54, at r. 3 (a number of names that is “one more than the number of
parties”).
277. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. R-12(a); AAA EMPLOYMENT
RULES, supra note 162, at r. 12.c.ii; ADR SERVICES RULES, supra note 54, at r. 11 (permitting parties to strike three of ten names); JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54, at
r. 15(b)–(c) (allowing parties to strike two names).
278. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at r. R-16; NAM COMPREHENSIVE RULES,
supra note 256, at r. 22.A.

656

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:619

Case type variation also allows providers to level the playing field
in forced arbitration. As mentioned above, the AAA and JAMS have
adopted protections for consumer and employment matters.279 These
measures would be impossible under the shackles of a trans-substantive regime, which would insist on treating a plaintiff with a small-dollar gripe about a product exactly the same as a multi-national conglomerate with an intellectual property claim.
In addition, institutional and party variation fosters innovation.
Litigation is litigation, but arbitration is, “at bottom[,] little more than
‘the parties’ dream.’”280 For instance, the AAA allows arbitrators to decide consumer claims for less than $25,000 without a hearing (a “desk
arbitration”),281 and JAMS sponsors “bracketed arbitration” (in which
the parties agree to minimum and maximum damage amounts)282 and
“baseball arbitration” (where each party suggests a remedy and the
arbitrator must pick one of them).283
But the mutability of the Arbitration Rules also skews the system
in favor of repeat players. Trans-substantive and uniform procedures
are simple. Indeed, when there is a single code, pro se litigants can
easily find the relevant principles, and “lawyers do not need to relearn
procedure every time they delve into a new field of substantive doctrine.”284 By contrast, the dizzying heterogeneity of the Arbitration
Rules is not user-friendly. Even an issue as fundamental as the admission of evidence285 varies widely between discrete sets of Arbitration
Rules. For instance, NAM’s Standard Rules state that “the Federal
Rules of Evidence shall be followed at all hearings,”286 but NAM’s Comprehensive Rules declare that “strict conformity to the Federal Rules

279. See supra text accompanying notes 159–65.
280. Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40
TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 449 (2005) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 336 (1958)).
281. See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at r. R-1(g). Other providers allow
the parties to choose this option. See NAM STANDARD RULES, supra note 255, at r. 9 (“The
parties may elect to have an accelerated hearing which does not permit hearing live
testimony by non-party witnesses. In general, accelerated hearings are concluded
within a matter of hours.”).
282. See JAMS Streamlined Rules, supra note 162, at r. 27.
283. See id. at r. 28.
284. Marcus, supra note 95, at 372.
285. Of course, the court system separates rules of procedure and evidence. However, the Arbitration Rules combine them, so I do as well. Also, as observed supra note
238, the Federal Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are supposed to be trans-substantive.
286. NAM STANDARD RULES, supra note 255, at r. 13.C.i.
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of Evidence is not required.”287 Likewise, ADR Services, JAMS, and JW
preserve the protections normally given to privileges and work product,288 but other providers do not.289 This complexity rewards parties
and lawyers who routinely arbitrate and can absorb nuances over
time. It might be one reason why studies show that there is an “extreme repeat player” effect in forced arbitration: businesses and plaintiffs’ law firms that frequently appear in a particular provider are also
especially likely to prevail on the merits.290 Ironically, then, the Arbitration Rules resurrect the pre-Federal Rules phenomenon of procedure under “a veritable minefield of ‘disconnected, inharmonious . . .
statutes.’”291
Finally, to abandon trans-substantivity is to remove a constraint
on procedural rule-makers. Because members of the Federal Rules
Committees are not elected, their handiwork must be apolitical.292
Trans-substantivity maintains this balance because it prevents the
Committees from making assessments about the desirability of certain causes of action.293 If a procedural code, say, prohibits defendants
from filing dispositive motions in asbestos cases but allows them in
section 1983 disputes, it has made an implicit judgment that mass
torts sit higher on the totem pole than civil rights litigation. By taking
this option off the table, trans-substantivity bolsters the legitimacy of
rulemaking by experts who have never appeared on a ballot.294 Yet the
Arbitration Rules, which already have shaky democratic footing, enable precisely the kind of gerrymandered procedures that the Federal
287. NAM COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 256, at r. 28.C.
288. See ADR SERVICES RULES, supra note 54, at r. 33(d) (“[T]he arbitrator shall apply applicable law relating to privileges and work product . . . .”); JW Commercial Rules,
supra note 54, at r. 12.C.1 (same); JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54, at r. 22(d)
(same); id. at r. 22(f) (“The [p]arties will not offer as evidence, and the [a]rbitrator shall
neither admit into the record nor consider, prior settlement offers by the [p]arties”);
JAMS Streamlined Rules, supra note 162, at r. 17(d), (f).
289. See AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 162, at r. 30 (“The arbitrator shall be
the judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered . . . .”); AAA CONSUMER
RULES, supra note 162, at r. R-34(c) (“The arbitrator shall consider applicable principles of legal privilege, such as those that involve the confidentiality of communications
between a lawyer and a client.”).
290. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 231, at 58 (reporting that “highlevel” and “super” repeat playing businesses and plaintiffs’ law firms outperformed
their one-shot counterparts in the AAA, JAMS, ADR Services, and Kaiser Permanente).
291. Aragaki, supra note 100, at 1965 (quoting Simplification of Judicial Procedure:
Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
64th Cong. 13 (1915) (statement of Thomas W. Shelton)).
292. See Marcus, supra note 95, at 378.
293. See id.
294. See id.
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Rules avoid. Although providers’ codes fluctuate with the general type
of case—not the specific cause of action—they nevertheless subject
different plaintiffs to unique procedures. For instance, NAM’s Employment Rules offer at least three depositions, twenty interrogatories,
and thirty requests for documents,295 but NAM’s Comprehensive
Rules contain no discovery guarantees.296 Regardless of whether this
is a wise policy decision, it is a policy decision.297 Thus, by embracing
substance-specificity, providers can do what court rule-makers cannot: superimpose their own normative perspectives on procedure.
To conclude, the Federal Rules are a monolith, but the Arbitration
Rules are a mosaic. As the Article discusses next, the two procedural
schemes also seek to accomplish different goals.
C. ACCURACY AND EFFICIENCY
An elementary question in procedural design is whether to favor
accuracy or efficiency. As this section explains, the Federal Rules try
to balance these competing objectives, but the Arbitration Rules do
not.
Procedures in the court system are supposed to walk a tightrope.
On the one hand, litigation must generate outcomes that are “correct.”
This tips the scales toward adopting forgiving pleading standards, liberal discovery rules, and searching appellate review.298 But on the
other hand, courts need to propel cases through the system at an acceptable pace and expense. This requires enacting hardnosed limitations on the parties’ access to information and opportunities to persuade.299 The Federal Rules are pitched at the midpoint between these
extremes. Indeed, as Rule 1 announces, the Federal Rules strive “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”300
As is well-known, arbitration is built for haste, not precision. The
FAA reflects this preference by making the scope of judicial review of
295. See NAM EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 19, at r.11(B)(i).
296. See NAM COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 256, at r. 18(A).
297. To be fair, Arbitration Rules that treat employment claims differently from
other claims can often be traced back to judicial rulings that require additional protections for employee plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying notes 217–32.
298. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON LONG RANGE PLAN., A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
RULEMAKING: A REPORT FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING TO THE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, 168 F.R.D. 679, 693 (1995) (describing this as the “primacy of
fairness” view of procedure).
299. See id. (calling this the “primary of efficiency” perspective).
300. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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arbitration awards “among the narrowest known at law.”301 Likewise,
the Arbitration Rules codify several famously streamlined attributes
of private dispute resolution. For instance, the Federal Rules entitle
parties to ten depositions and twenty-five written interrogatories.302
But although the Arbitration Rules vary by institution and case type,
they generally “do not [permit] comprehensive discovery,” which
“would be contrary to [the] goal of efficient and economical resolutions.”303 Similarly, federal judges can take as long as they want to
write opinions304 and must explain their logic.305 By contrast, arbitrators often need to rule within thirty days of the hearing306 and do not
necessarily have to justify their conclusions.307 Sleek features like
these are why arbitration enjoys a reputation for being “quicker and
less costly than litigation.”308

301. Balch v. Oracle Corp., No. CV DKC 19-1353, 2019 WL 6052670, at *3 (D. Md.
Nov. 15, 2019); see also supra text accompanying note 106.
302. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2), 33(a).
303. NAM STANDARD RULES, supra note 255, at r. 12.
304. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge’s Decisions Are Conspicuously Late, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/nyregion/judges-decisions
-are-conspicuously-late.html [https://perma.cc/PV6S-W7ES] (observing that some
judges take months or even longer to issue decisions).
305. For instance, in bench trials, “the court must find the facts specially and state
its conclusions of law separately.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). Likewise, when resolving a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court should state on the record the reasons for
granting or denying the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Finally, “[e]very order granting
an injunction and every restraining order must: . . . state the reasons why it issued.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(a).
306. See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at r. R-42; JAMS Streamlined Rules,
supra note 162, at r. 19(a); JW Commercial Rules, supra note 54, at r. 13.B.1; cf. CPR
Rules, supra note 54, at r. 15.8a (“The final award should in most circumstances be
submitted by the Tribunal to CPR within two months after the close of the proceedings.”). Likewise, some providers offer fast-and-furious dispute resolution tracks, such
as USA&M’s option for expedited hearings within forty-five days of the opening of the
case. See USA&M RULES, supra note 54, at r. 4.b.
307. See USA&M RULES, supra note 54, at r. 21.b (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators are not required to provide written opinions or explanations with
their awards.”); NAM STANDARD RULES, supra note 255, at r. 16.A (not requiring reasoned awards). But see AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at r. R-43(b) (instructing
the arbitrator to “provide the concise written reasons for the decision unless the parties all agree otherwise”); CPR Rules, supra note 54, at r. 15.2 (“All awards shall be in
writing and shall state the reasoning on which the award rests unless the parties agree
otherwise.”); JAMS Streamlined Rules, supra note 162, at r. 19(g) (“Unless all Parties
agree otherwise, the Award shall also contain a concise written statement of the reasons for the Award.”).
308. APC Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Martinez, 600 S.W.3d 381, 400 (Tex. App.
2019).
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However, the Arbitration Rules also prioritize efficiency in lessobvious ways. For one, to make cases fast and final, providers use a
merciless waiver doctrine. The AAA, ADR Services, ARC, JAMS, and
USA&M declare that “[a]ny party who proceeds with the arbitration
after knowledge that any provision or requirement of these rules has
not been complied with and who fails to state an objection in writing
shall be deemed to have waived the right to object.”309 This principle
makes sense in some contexts. For example, by forcing parties to flag
violations of the Rules immediately, the waiver doctrine prevents
them from keeping such an argument in their back pocket as insurance against an unfavorable result on the merits.310 Yet in other situations, the waiver doctrine shields flawed awards from judicial oversight. Simply because the affected party did not complain in time or in
writing, judges have upheld decisions by arbitrators who engaged in
“private conversations” with one side,311 ignored their duty to produce a reasoned award,312 and accepted new evidence or legal theories at the eleventh hour.313
309. ADR SERVICES RULES, supra note 54, at r. 36; AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note
162, at r. R-50; ARC RULES, supra note 54, at r. 18; USA&M RULES, supra note 54, at r. 19;
cf. JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54, at r. 27(a) (“If a Party becomes aware of
a violation of or failure to comply with these Rules and fails promptly to object in writing, the objection will be deemed waived, unless the Arbitrator determines that waiver
will cause substantial injustice or hardship.”).
310. The waiver rule often applies when an arbitrator rules after the thirty-day
deadline: a milieu in which a party’s belated protest seems suspicious. See Anzalone v.
Doan, 540 So. 2d 385, 386 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (“A party should not be permitted to wait
and see whether the arbitrator will rule in his or her favor before asserting his or her
objection.” (quoting Five Keys, Inc. v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 653 P.2d 870, 873 (N.M. 1982)));
Zervos v. Freedman Props., Ltd., 539 A.2d 336, 339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (“It
was not until after the award had been submitted that Muller . . . expressed an unwillingness to adhere to the award because of its untimeliness.”); accord Davis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014); Darin & Armstrong, Inc. v.
Monte Costella, Inc., 542 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
311. Cellular Radio Corp. v. OKI Am., Inc., 664 A.2d 357, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
312. See Steinmann v. ZTE Corp., 692 F. App’x 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2017).
313. For instance, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Zampedro, No. 3247, 1983 WL 6040
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983), the arbitrator permitted a party to submit medical records during the arbitration even though the AAA requires such evidence “to be submitted 20 days prior to [the] hearing.” Id. at *1. The other side protested orally. See id.
An Ohio appellate court held that the “verbal objection . . . was ineffective.” Id. at *3; see
also Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Hammonasset Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Civ. Action
No. H-08-1865, 2008 WL 5378065, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008) (deciding that a party
waived its right to challenge the fact that its adversary “altered its theory of breach of
contract in its later filings”); Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 932 P.2d 1312,
1317 (Alaska 1997) (holding that a party waived right to object to the fact that “on the
first day of the arbitration proceeding, [the other party] asserted that it was entitled to
recovery on the basis of a previously unarticulated theory of liability”); Fraund v.
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Similarly, providers have maximized arbitral power over arbitrability in the name of expediency. Suppose one party files an arbitration
and the other party argues either that the arbitration agreement is invalid or that some claims do not fall within its ambit. Originally, providers respected the fact that the FAA assigns these issues to judges314
and instructed both sides “to refer this issue at once to the courts for
a determination and arbitrators [to] suspend proceedings while the
matter is being decided.”315 But then providers recognized that this
brought the arbitration to a screeching halt. To maintain arbitration’s
rocket-fueled velocity, several institutions adopted Arbitration Rules
that allow arbitrators to entertain “any objections with respect to the
existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.”316 Thus, the
Arbitration Rules allow arbitrators to decide the very question of
whether a case should be arbitrated.317
Design Ideas, Inc., 551 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Conn. 1989) (determining that a party
“waived any objection to the posthearing submission of evidence”); EEC Prop. Co. v.
Kaplan, 578 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a party waived its
right to contest the arbitrator’s imposition of an arguably unrequested remedy). Admittedly, a litigant who fails to object to a trial court’s ruling generally cannot raise the
issue on appeal. Yet this rule is not absolute. See Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255
F.3d 1136, 1145–47 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that federal courts apply the doctrine
of “fundamental error” to review claimed violations of “civil case procedures absent an
objection”).
314. See supra text accompanying note 105.
315. KELLOR, supra note 71, at 69.
316. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at r. R-14(a); AAA COMMERCIAL RULES,
supra note 23, at r. R-7(a); AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 162, at r. 6.a; ADR
SERVICES RULES, supra note 54, at r. 8 (“Unless the issue of arbitrability has been previously determined by the court, the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.”); CPR Rules, supra note 54, at r. 8.1 (“The Tribunal
shall have the power to hear and determine challenges to its jurisdiction, including any
objections with respect to the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement.”); FORUM, supra note 253, at r. 3.1.E (“An Arbitrator shall have the power to rule
on all issues, Claims, Responses, questions of arbitrability, and objections regarding
the existence, scope, and validity of the Arbitration Agreement including all objections
relating to jurisdiction, unconscionability, contract law, and enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement.”); cf. JAMS Streamlined Rules, supra note 162, at r. 8(b) (“Jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is sought, and
who are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and ruled on by the
Arbitrator.”).
317. To be clear, as a matter of federal common law, arbitrators decide “‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition,” such
as laches, estoppel, and compliance with a condition precedent to arbitration. Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)). Thus, even without the Arbitration Rules, arbitrators could resolve so-called “procedural arbitrability” themselves.
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Doing so blesses a practice that would never pass muster in court.
Judges cannot preside over issues that will affect their own pocketbooks. For example, federal judges must be disqualified if they have “a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy.”318 Likewise,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits decision-makers from resolving questions in which they have a “direct,
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary” stake.319 Nevertheless, providers permit arbitrators to decide arbitrability even though arbitrators
have money riding on the outcome. Indeed, because arbitrators bill by
the hour, they can keep their meters running by rejecting arbitrability
challenges and then presiding over the merits.320 In this additional
way, the Arbitration Rules value speed over accuracy over due process
and accuracy.
***
Accordingly, the Federal Rules and the Arbitration Rules reflect
dueling views about procedure. Many of the Arbitration Rules’ unique
characteristics facilitate inventive and cost-effective dispute resolution. However, these departures from court-based norms also produce toxic byproducts: procedures that either intentionally or effectively slant cases toward corporations. This next Part explains how
courts can translate these insights into doctrinal recommendations.
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
Because the Arbitration Rules are integral to organized arbitration, they have started to play a leading role in the federal common
law that implements the FAA. Indeed, when courts decide whether to
enforce an arbitration clause or an award, they often must grapple
with providers’ codes. This Part examines three unsettled topics that
318. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
319. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (quoting Ward v. Vill. of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)). Admittedly, “the state action element of a due
process claim is absent in a private arbitration case.” Murillo v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-1883, 2019 WL 3081062, at *9 (D. Conn. July 15, 2019).
Yet my point is not that the Arbitration Rules violate the Due Process Clause; rather, it
is simply that they authorize conduct that the judicial system proscribes.
320. In a previous article, I compared a sample of judicial and arbitral rulings on
the issue of “clause construction:” whether an arbitration clause that does not mention
class actions allows such proceedings. See David Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse
into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L.J. 1323, 1327 (2019). Because
class arbitrations can be long and complicated, arbitrators have financial incentives to
preside over them. See id. Consistent with the theory that arbitrators further their own
pecuniary self-interest, I determined that the odds of a decision-maker finding that a
“silent” arbitration provision permitted class claims was 63.7 times higher in arbitration than in court. See id. at 1371.
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hinge on these principles: implied delegation clauses, “weaponized”
Arbitration Rules, and mass arbitrations. Drawing on the analysis in
Part II, it urges judges to attack these issues by paying closer attention
to the ways in which private procedural rulemaking diverges from the
baseline of state-created procedures.
A. IMPLIED DELEGATION CLAUSES
Rent-A-Center opened the door for drafters to use delegation
clauses to “clearly and unmistakably” entrust the arbitrator with deciding whether the arbitration should proceed.321 Recently, many
courts have found that the mere fact a contract selects a particular set
of Arbitration Rules serves as an implied delegation clause. This section criticizes these holdings and explains why they should not apply
to forced arbitration.322

321. See supra text accompanying notes 171–73.
322. This Section expands upon arguments I originally made in David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 418–22 (2018). Unfortunately, as this
Article was in the editing stage, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify this oft-litigated topic when it granted certiorari in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,
Inc., No. 19-963, 2020 WL 3146679, at *1 (U.S. June 15, 2020). This case’s tortured path
began when Archer and White and Pelton and Crane (which was Henry Schein’s predecessor-in-interest) entered into an arbitration agreement that both incorporated the
AAA Rules and exempted “actions seeking injunctive relief.” Archer & White Sales, Inc.
v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 139 S.
Ct. 524 (2019). Archer and White then sued Henry Schein seeking damages and an injunction. See id. Henry Schein fired back by arguing that the arbitrator should decide
the issue of whether the injunction claim was subject to arbitration. See id. For reasons
that are not relevant to this Article, the case bounced from the Fifth Circuit to the Court
and then back to the Fifth Circuit. See Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc.,
935 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-1080, 2020 WL 3146709 (U.S.
June 15, 2020), and cert. granted, No. 19-963, 2020 WL 3146679 (U.S. June 15, 2020).
In 2019, the Fifth Circuit held that the carve out for injunctive relief trumped the AAA’s
Rules and meant that courts (not arbitrators) had the power to rule on arbitrability.
See id. at 281–82. This opinion then sparked dueling petitions for certiorari. Henry
Schein asked the Court to decide whether the Fifth Circuit interpreted the relationship
between the carve out and the AAA Rules correctly. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at *2, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., No. 19-963, 2020 WL 529195
(U.S. Jan. 31, 2020). In response, Archer and White filed a conditional cross-petition on
the broader topic of “[w]hether an arbitration agreement that identifies a set of arbitration rules to apply if there is arbitration clearly and unmistakably delegates to the
arbitrator disputes about whether the parties agreed to arbitrate in the first place.”
Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *1, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer &
White Sales, Inc., No. 19-963, 2020 WL 1391910 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2020). Although Archer
and White’s framing of the case teed up the implied delegation conundrum perfectly,
the Justices only granted Henry Schein’s petition. See Henry Schein, 2020 WL 3146679,
at *1.
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In the past decade, dozens of courts have tried to square Rent-ACenter with Arbitration Rules that empower arbitrators to decide arbitrability. As noted above, most providers have adopted some version of the principle that an arbitrator possesses “the power to rule on
his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to
the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.”323 Federal appellate courts have unanimously held that this language passes
the baton to the arbitrator to decide arbitrability.324
Yet these decisions are thinly reasoned,325 and most of them feature negotiated deals between equally powerful parties.326 Thus, state
323. See supra text accompanying note 316.
324. See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2009); Contec
Corp. v. Remote Sol. Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005); Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petrol. Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); Fallo v. High–Tech Inst.,
559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069,
1075 (9th Cir. 2013); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch LP, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2005); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006) abrogated on other grounds by Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
524 (2019).
Some courts exempt “narrow” arbitration clauses, reasoning that when the parties list particular claims that are “subject to arbitration, and arbitrability [i]s not one
of th[em],” then selecting a provider’s code does “not clearly and unmistakably submit
the issue of arbitrability to arbitration.” Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. San Juan Basin
Royalty Tr., 249 S.W.3d 34, 40 (Tex. App. 2007); see also Turi v. Main St. Adoption
Servs., LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Henry
Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (same result where parties incorporated AAA rules but only agreed to arbitrate claims “regarding fees”); Temple v. Best Rate Holdings LLC, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (explaining
that a “simple reference to the [AAA] rules is insufficient to constitute ‘clear and unmistakable’ language evincing an intent to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability
where the arbitration provision is ‘narrow’ rather than ‘broad’”).
Likewise, there is a circuit split about whether choosing a set of Arbitration Rules
empowers the arbitrator to engage in clause construction and decide whether an arbitration clause allows class arbitration. Compare Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout
Petrol., LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 764 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that incorporating the AAA
Rules does not delegate clause construction to the arbitrator); Dell Webb Cmtys., Inc.
v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867, 876–77 (4th Cir. 2016) (same); Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599–600 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Catamaran
Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966, 972–73 (8th Cir. 2017) (same), with Reed
v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 635–36 (5th Cir. 2012) (reaching the opposite
conclusion); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 2018) (same);
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, 899 F.3d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (same).
325. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor George A. Bermann in Support of Respondent at 6, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019)
(No. 17-1272), 2018 WL 4908389, at *6 [hereinafter Henry Schein Brief] (“[N]one of
these decisions provides any reasoning whatsoever as to how or why incorporation of
such arbitral rules meets the clear and unmistakable evidence test.”).
326. See, e.g., Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1075 (“[A]s long as an arbitration agreement is
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supreme courts, appellate courts, and federal district judges disagree
about whether to extend the implied delegation logic to adhesion contracts.327
Compounding this confusion, the federal circuit courts seem to
have misunderstood the relevant Arbitration Rules. As mentioned
above, providers give arbitrators “the power to rule on [their] own jurisdiction” in order to save time by resolving arbitrability challenges
when a dispute is already pending in arbitration.328 But the implied
delegation cases arise in court. With the possible exception of JAMS,
providers do not mandate that judges defer to arbitrators in this context.329 Indeed, traditional delegation clauses often make arbitral
between sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, those parties shall be expected
to understand that incorporation of [a provider’s] rules delegates questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”); see also Contec, 398 F.3d at 207 (holding questions of the
arbitrability of a contract between two companies to be arbitrable); Petrofac, 687 F.3d
at 674–75 (same); Terminix, 432 F.3d at 1332–33 (same); Qualcomm, 466 F.3d at 1374
(same). But cf. Awuah, 554 F.3d at 11 (holding the same for franchise agreements between a commercial janitorial services contractor and its franchisee janitors); Fallo,
559 F.3d at 877–78 (holding the same for enrollment agreements between a for-profit
vocational school and its students); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2015) (holding the same for an employment contract between a bank and an executive-level employee).
327. Compare Eiess v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 404 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1253–54 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (refusing to find that incorporated Arbitration Rules function as an implied
delegation clause when the non-drafting party is not “sophisticated”); Meadows v.
Dickey’s Barbecue Rests. Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (same);
Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 13-CV-05682, 2014 WL 2903752, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June
25, 2014) (same), aff’d, 840 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2016); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toll Bros., 171
F. Supp. 3d 417, 427–29 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (same), granting arb. 2016 WL 1086720 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 21, 2016); Glob. Client Sols., LLC v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361, 369 (Mont. 2016)
(same), with Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 968, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that “nearly every [post-Oracle] decision in the Northern District of California . . .
has consistently found effective delegation of arbitrability regardless of the sophistication of the parties” and holding as such); Cordas v. Uber Techs., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d
985, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Zenelaj, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 973) (same); Bernal v. Sw.
& Pac. Specialty Fin., Inc., No. C 12–05797, 2014 WL 1868787, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 7,
2014) (same); Kimble v. Rhodes Coll., Inc., No. C-10-5786, 2011 WL 2175249, at *2, *4
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (same); Anderson v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. C 04-4808, 2005
WL 1048700, at *3, *5 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2005) (same); Mercadante v. XE Servs., LLC, 78
F. Supp. 3d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2015) (same), enforcing arb. ord. 2016 WL 4435173 (D.D.C.
Aug. 19, 2016), dismissing for failure to prosecute 323 F.R.D. 76 (2017); Willis v. Dixie
Elec. Power Ass’n, No. 18-CV-30, 2020 WL 601389, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 2020)
(same); Howard v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., No. 10-CV-103, 2010 WL 3009515, at *3–6 (E.D.
Tenn. July 28, 2010) (same).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 316–17.
329. See Henry Schein Brief, supra note 325, at 9–10 (observing that express delegation clauses “address[] the role of both courts and arbitrators and clearly state[] that
the [arbitral] tribunal had not only primary, but indeed exclusive, authority to resolve
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authority over arbitrability “exclusive,” but the AAA, ADR Services,
CPR, and the Forum do not expressly foreclose courts from ruling on
the topic.330 Making matters worse, because arbitration administrators create their codes in hermetic isolation, judges cannot consult
hearing transcripts or committee reports to correct this apparent mistake.
However, even if it is too late to alter how the Arbitration Rules
affect sophisticated parties, courts should not imply delegation
clauses into adhesion contracts. Recall that Arbitration Rules become
part of a contract under the doctrine of incorporation by reference.331
This venerable common law principle permits terms that are not
physically attached to an agreement to breathe life into it.332 Critically,
though, this extrinsic language does not become part of the transaction unless the parties “had knowledge of and assented to [it] . . . so
that the incorporation will not result in surprise or hardship.”333
There can be little doubt that consumers and employees neither know
about nor consent to byzantine procedural codes written by arbitration administrators. As one district court put it, “[I]ncorporating forty
issues of arbitrability”). JAMS’s rule may be different because it goes further than its
competitors by stating that “arbitrability disputes . . . shall be submitted to and ruled
on by the [a]rbitrator.” JAMS Streamlined Rules, supra note 162, at r. 8(b) (emphasis
added).
330. See Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 789 (Ct. App. 2012)
(“[N]othing in the AAA rules states that the AAA arbitrator, as opposed to the court,
shall determine those threshold issues, or has exclusive authority to do so, particularly
if litigation has already been commenced.”); GAC Int’l, LLC v. Roth Licensing, LLC, No.
15-CV-2375, 2019 WL 174972, at *4 (finding that ADR Services’ rules permit prior judicial rulings to preclude an arbitrator ruling on a dispute’s arbitrability); CPR Rules,
supra note 54, at r. 8; FORUM, supra note 54, at r. 3.1(E); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra
note 69, at 1125 (“[T]hese rules do not affirmatively exclude the jurisdiction of courts
over the arbitrability challenge.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. L. OF INT’L COM. ARB. § 2.8
cmt. b (2019) (expressing skepticism about whether incorporating a set of Arbitration
Rules “foreclose[s] judicial consideration of [arbitrability]”).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 123–24.
332. See, e.g., Beacon Sales Acquisition, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teamsters Indus.
Emps. Pension Fund, 425 F. Supp. 3d 377, 390 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 825 Pension Fund v. River Front Recycling Aggregate, LLC, No. CV 15-8957, 2016 WL 6804869, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2016)) (explaining
that incorporation by reference “allows parties to ‘incorporate contractual terms by
reference to a separate, contemporaneous document’”), voluntarily dismissing appeal
2020 WL 3816323 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2020).
333. State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of W. Va. v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 586, 598 (W. Va. 2013);
Beacon Sales, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 390 (quoting Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots
Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 2003)) (“Incorporation by reference is proper where . . .
incorporation of the document will not result in surprise or hardship.”); cf. 11
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:25 (4th ed. 2020) (“[I]t must be clear that the parties to
the agreement had knowledge of and assented to the incorporated terms . . . .”).
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pages of arbitration rules into an arbitration clause is tantamount to
inserting boilerplate inside of boilerplate . . . .”334 Moreover, allowing
the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration should proceed is the
epitome of a “surprise or hardship.” As noted, arbitrators have financial incentives to reject arbitrability challenges so they can bill for entertaining the merits of a case.335 For these reasons, the idea of an implicit but “clear and unmistakable” delegation clause should be an
oxymoron.
Finally, removing courts from the arbitrability calculus would
make procedural rulemaking by providers even more fraught. As
noted above, the primary check on runaway arbitration administrators has been judicial review of arbitration clauses.336 Yet, if virtually
every contract that selects a set of Arbitration Rules automatically bypasses this safeguard, providers will have little reason to create evenhanded procedures that balance both parties’ interests.337 Thus, in the
context of forced arbitration, courts should require more than an allusion to the Arbitration Rules to permit arbitrators to decide arbitrability.
B. WEAPONIZED ARBITRATION RULES
To reiterate, the Federal Rules are trans-substantive and uniform,338 but the Arbitration Rules are procedural shapeshifters.339 Recently, corporations have recognized that they can exploit this
334. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toll Bros., 171 F. Supp. 3d 417, 429 (E.D. Pa.), granting arb.
2016 WL 1086720 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2016). Likewise, a California appellate panel highlighted the disconnect between the “clear and unmistakable” test and obscure dispute
resolution provisions:
[T]he reference to AAA rules does not give an employee, confronted with an
agreement she is asked to sign in order to obtain or keep employment, much
of a clue that she is giving up her usual right to have the court decide whether
the arbitration provision is enforceable. Assuming that an employee reads
the arbitration provision in the proposed agreement, notes that disputes will
be resolved by arbitration according to AAA rules, and even has the wherewithal and diligence to track down those rules, examine them, and focus on
the particular rule. . . . [It] tells the reader almost nothing.
Ajamian, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 789.
335. See supra text accompanying note 320.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 214–19.
337. See generally Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 161, at 298 (“[A]rbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure to devise systems that favor the corporate
repeat players who decide whether those companies will receive their lucrative business.” (quoting Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(4)
(2009))).
338. See Marcus, supra note 95, at 394–99.
339. See supra Part II.B.
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difference through what I call “weaponized rules”—selecting codes intended for one form of dispute for the wrong type of case. This section
argues that a drafter’s use of weaponized rules should be grounds for
striking down the entire arbitration agreement and permitting the
matter to proceed in court.
Weaponized rules emerged in the late 2000s. They were pioneered by firms that hire independent contractors. Even if these workers are technically not “employees,” their lawsuits are “unquestionably . . . employment case[s].”340 Yet drafters realized that they did not
necessarily need to subject independent contractors to a provider’s
employment dispute rules. Instead, they began to select the AAA’s
Commercial Rules or JAMS’s Comprehensive Rules in agreements with
workers.341 Likewise, some merchants and insurers—which the AAA
classifies as participants in “consumer” markets342—have ditched the
institution’s Consumer Rules for its Commercial Rules.343 These defendants all seek the same thing: to escape the orbit of the Due Process
Protocols and Minimum Standards that govern forced arbitration.
To make the stakes here concrete, suppose an independent contractor signs an arbitration clause that prohibits awards of attorneys’
fees and later files a Title VII claim. The choice of Arbitration Rules will
have a profound impact on her lawsuit. For one, if either the AAA’s or
JAMS’ Employment Rules apply, the company must pay most filing and
340. Rodriguez v. Castforce, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1154 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
341. See, e.g., Kauffman v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., No. 16-CV-04580, 2018 WL 4094959,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2018) (incorporating the AAA Commercial Rules into an agreement with an independent contractor), settlement approved, 2019 WL 1785453 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 24, 2019); Andresen v. IntePros Fed., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 143, 147 (D.D.C.
2017) (same); Rodriguez, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1153 (same); Loewen v. Lyft, Inc., 129 F.
Supp. 3d 945, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (same); Afrasiabi v. Hern, No. H033744, 2009 WL
3979004, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009) (incorporating the JAMS Comprehensive
Rules into an agreement with an independent contractor); see also Baker v. Anytime
Labor-Kan., LLC, No. 16-CV-00447, 2016 WL 9245464, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2016)
(incorporating the AAA Commercial Rules into an employment agreement); Sanchez v.
Homebridge Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 17-CV-1267, 2018 WL 1392892, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
20, 2018) (incorporating the JAMS Comprehensive Rules into an employment agreement); cf. Nix v. Cabco Yellow, Inc., No. G056110, 2019 WL 3714528, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 7, 2019) (incorporating the option for either the JAMS Comprehensive or Streamlined Arbitration Rules into an agreement with an independent contractor).
342. See AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 162, at r. 1(a).
343. See, e.g., Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 13-CV-05682, 2014 WL 2903752, at
*1, *17 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (finding that the seller of genetic testing kit which
costs less than $100 selected the AAA Commercial Rules), aff’d, 840 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.
2016); Auden v. IHC Health Sols. Indep. Holding Grp., No. 1 CA-CV 18-0191, 2019 WL
438798, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019) (finding that an insurer chose the AAA Commercial Rules).

2020]

ARBITRATION RULES

669

administrative costs and all of the arbitrator’s fees.344 Conversely, the
AAA Commercial and JAMS Comprehensive Rules divide these costs
equally among the parties.345 Likewise, AAA Employment Rule 39(d)
allows arbitrators to “grant any remedy or relief that would have been
available . . . had the matter been heard in court.”346 In turn, because
Title VII allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees,347
Rule 39(d) would permit the arbitrator to ignore the “no attorneys’
fees” provision in the arbitration agreement. By contrast, AAA Commercial Rule 47(a) limits arbitrators to awards that are “within the
scope of the agreement of the parties” and thus would require the arbitrator to enforce the “no attorneys’ fees” clause.348
Courts have uniformly failed to recognize these adverse consequences for plaintiffs. In fact, some do not find weaponized rules troubling at all. For instance, in Baker v. Anytime Labor-Kansas, LLC, a class
of plaintiff workers sued a temporary employment agency for age discrimination.349 They had each signed an arbitration clause that applied to “disputes arising out of [their] employment,” but, paradoxically, selected the AAA’s Commercial Rules.350 Although they argued
that “arbitration would be cost prohibitive,” a federal judge in Missouri disagreed, opining that “[t]he arbitration agreement is not void
solely because it . . . imposes a financial duty on Plaintiffs.”351

344. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 221; JAMS Employment Rules, supra note 162, at
r. 31(c).
345. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. R-54; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE
RULES, supra note 54, at r. 31; cf. Answering Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees at 14, Auden,
No. 1 CA-CV 18-0191, 2019 WL 438798 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019) 2018 WL 3578803
(introducing expert testimony that arbitrating against an insurer would cost the plaintiff up to $92,620 under the AAA’s Commercial Rules but a mere $200 under the AAA’s
Consumer Rules).
346. AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 162, at r. 39(d).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
348. AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. R-47(a); In re Arb. Between Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. & Depew, 814 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
that, under the AAA Commercial Rules, “arbitrators may award attorneys’ fees only
when the contract . . . includes an express authorization”); Beacon Towers Condo. Tr. v.
Alex, 42 N.E.3d 1144, 1148 (Mass. 2016) (holding an arbitrator erred by awarding attorney’s’ fees under the AAA Commercial Rules where “no provision of the parties’
agreement . . . authorizes the award of attorney’s fees”).
349. No. 16-CV-00447, 2016 WL 9245464, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2016).
350. Id.
351. Id. at *6; see also Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 13-CV-05682, 2014 WL
2903752, at *17 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (rejecting cost-based challenge to arbitration
clause that accompanied sale of consumer product but selected AAA Commercial
Rules), aff’d, 840 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2016); Loewen v. Lyft, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 945,
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Even judges who have been more alarmed by weaponized rules
have let drafters off with a proverbial slap on the wrist. For example,
in Rodriguez v. Castforce, Inc., a district court in Georgia compelled arbitration of an independent contractor’s claim under the Commercial
Rules but also implored the company “if it is genuinely interested in a
fair arbitration, [to] consent to . . . proceeding under the AAA Employment Rules.”352 Likewise, in Kauffman v. U-Haul International, Inc., a
Pennsylvania federal court held that choosing the AAA’s Commercial
Rules for an employment dispute was unconscionable because it saddled the plaintiff with thousands of dollars of additional fees.353 But
rather than voiding the entire arbitration agreement, the court struck
down the contract’s incorporation of the Commercial Rules “only insofar as [it] require[s the plaintiff] to pay arbitration fees and
costs.”354 The judge then enforced the rest of the contract as written,355 overlooking the fact that the AAA’s Employment and Commercial Rules diverge on topics other than the allocation of expenses, such
as the arbitrator’s power to award remedies.356
963 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting cost-based challenge to arbitration clause in independent contractor agreement that selected the AAA Commercial Rules).
352. 190 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1154 (N.D. Ga. 2016). Rodriguez was a Fair Labor Standards Act case brought by an independent contractor. See id. at 1150–51. The company
chose the AAA Commercial Rules, id. at 1153, and also specified that the prevailing
party could recover its litigation expenses, see id. at 1150. The plaintiff argued that the
arbitration provision was unconscionable for two reasons: unlike the Employment
Rules, the Commercial Rules required him to pay hefty fees and would permit the defendant to recover attorneys’ fees from him if it prevailed. See id. at 1153–54. The court
conceded that the plaintiff’s “unconscionability argument has some persuasive appeal,” but held that the arbitrator should resolve it. Id. at 1154.
353. No. 16-CV-04580, 2018 WL 4094959, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2018) (reasoning
that the plaintiff “would incur fees of $1,550 just to file his claim, exclusive of hourly
arbitrator fees, room rental fees, or other fees” and “[b]y contrast, under the AAA’s
Employment Arbitration Rules . . . the employee’s fees are capped at $200”).
354. Id. at *11.
355. See id.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 340–41. Compare AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES,
supra note 162, at r. 39(d), with AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. R-47. In
2017, the AAA tried to curtail the use of weaponized rules. The institution added a
footnote to its Commercial Rules that specified that it “will apply the Employment Fee
Schedule to any dispute between an individual employee or an independent contractor . . . and a business or organization and the dispute involves work or work-related
claims.” AM. ARB. ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, at
r. R-1 n.* (2017), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/CommercialRules_Web_
FINAL_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9N4-LPFB]. Although this was a huge step in the
right direction, it has not solved the problem of weaponized rules. Two years later, the
Attorneys General of twelve states wrote a letter to the AAA complaining about “instances where AAA arbitrators have applied the Commercial Fee Schedule to workers
classified as independent contractors.” Letter to Ann Lesser, Vice President, Am. Arb.
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Contrary to these opinions, a corporation’s use of weaponized
rules should invalidate the whole arbitration agreement. There is
well-developed body of law on severance: the choice between merely
deleting offensive terms and compelling arbitration or nullifying the
core agreement to arbitrate and permitting the plaintiff to proceed in
court.357 Unfair terms cannot be severed—and thus must drag the entire arbitration agreement down with them—if they either (1) are “an
essential part of the parties’ agreement”358 or (2) demonstrate that
the drafter was “overreaching.”359
Weaponized rules meet both elements of this test. For one, the
Arbitration Rules are the heart of the arbitral scheme. Indeed, as even
Kauffman acknowledged, the selection of the AAA’s Commercial Rules
“cannot be severed in its entirety because, in its absence, there would
be no rules at all governing the arbitration.”360 Thus, ill-fitting Arbitration Rules are “not simply a minor logistical consideration ancillary to
the arbitration agreement.”361 And on top of this, weaponized rules
are rank efforts by firms to capitalize on their superior knowledge of

Ass’n 2 (Nov. 12, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/
AAA-Arbitration-Data-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ2E-PNEJ]. Moreover, the forgiving fee schedule of the Employment Rules is not the only difference between various
types of Rules. See supra text accompanying notes 340–41.
357. See Kauffman, 2018 WL 4094959, at *9 (“[A] court may sever, or remove, an
offensive term from a contract so long as doing so does not disturb the primary intent
of the parties’ agreement. . . . ‘[Y]ou don’t cut down the trunk of a tree because some of
its branches are sickly.’” (quoting Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 213 (3d.
Cir. 2003))); id. at *10 (finding that an arbitration provision must be struck down entirely in cases where “the sickness has infected the trunk, we must cut down the entire
tree” (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2003))).
358. Id. at *10; In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., No. 18MD2836, 2018 WL
6795836, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 6, 2018) (citing Huber v. Huber, 470 A.2d 1385, 1389–90
(1984)) (“An unenforceable contract provision may not be severed, if that provision is
an essential part of the parties’ agreement.”); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696 (Cal. 2000) (“If the central purpose of the contract is tainted
with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated
from the contract . . . .”).
359. Trompeter v. Ally Fin., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he more the employer overreaches, the less likely a court will be able to sever the provisions and enforce the clause . . . .”); Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 207 (3d Cir. 2010)
(reasoning that severance is not warranted “if the agreement demonstrates that the
employer sought to impose arbitration on the employee as an inferior, one-sided forum”).
360. Kauffman, 2018 WL 4094959, at *11.
361. Galey v. World Mktg. All., 510 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2007).
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providers’ codes.362 Weaponized rules do not randomly drift into contracts; rather, companies strategically deploy them to deter claims.
When courts respond by bending over backwards to preserve the
commitment to arbitrate, they “encourage[] those who draft contracts
of adhesion to overreach.”363 For these reasons, judges should rethink
their approach to weaponized rules.
C. MASS ARBITRATIONS
Recently, a striking new trend has surfaced in the post-class action landscape. Plaintiffs have filed thousands of individual cases—
"mass arbitrations”—against the same company. This Section explains how the Arbitration Rules both helped create this phenomenon
and will dictate its future.
As discussed above, in the 2010s, the Court used the FAA to sound
“the death knell for consumer and employment class actions.”364 By
making class arbitration waivers unimpeachable, opinions like Concepcion prevented plaintiffs from banding together and forced them
to arbitrate their own low-value claims individually.365 These decisions are widely regarded as one of the boldest deregulatory strokes
since Lochner v. New York.366 After all, “the realistic alternative to a
class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits,
as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”367
Nevertheless, in a jaw-dropping development, plaintiffs’ lawyers
have found a way to “turn[] class action waivers into a weapon for
[consumers and] workers.”368 They have achieved this goal by doing
what nobody expected them to do: arbitrating. For example: in 2018,
12,501 drivers filed their own claims against Uber, alleging that it had
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them
362. See supra text accompanying notes 284–91.
363. McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 861 (Wash. 2008).
364. Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 116 (2015); see also
supra text accompanying notes 177–81.
365. 563 U.S. 333, 350–52 (2011).
366. See Burt Neuborne, Ending Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 184–
85 (2015) (placing Concepcion in a string of Supreme Court contract rights-based holdings that “ha[ve] the effect of diluting the real-world value of post-Lochner reforms”).
367. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
368. See Alison Frankel, After Postmates Again Balks at Arbitration Fees, Workers
Seek Contempt Order, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal
-us-otc-massarb/after-postmates-again-balks-at-arbitration-fees-workers-seek
-contempt-order-idUSKBN1Y62E8 [https://web.archive.org/web/20200908161304
/https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-massarb/after-postmates-againbalks-at-arbitration-fees-workers-seek-contempt-order-idUSKBN1Y62E8].
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minimum wage and overtime.369 Similarly, in 2019, 5,257 food couriers for Postmates brought their own burst of FLSA arbitrations.370 And
other mass arbitrations have targeted AT&T,371 Chipotle,372 DoorDash,373 FanDuel,374 Lyft,375 Sallie Mae,376 and Macy’s.377
The plaintiffs’ attorneys who engineered many of these cases are
trying to capitalize on a loophole in the Arbitration Rules.378 As one
beleaguered corporate lawyer complained, these principles are “not
designed for mass, identical filings.”379 The problem is simple: the AAA
Commercial Rules and JAMS Comprehensive Rules require defendants
to pay a deposit of about $1,500 for each arbitration.380 Of course, that
369. Petition for Order Compelling Arbitration at 2, Abadilla v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. 18-CV-7343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018).
370. Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also
Frankel, supra note 368.
371. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 231, at 54 (noting that data disclosed
by the AAA reveals that one plaintiffs’ firm filed nearly 1,100 arbitrations on the same
day against the telecommunications giant).
372. See Michael Hiltzik, Chipotle May Have Outsmarted Itself by Blocking Thousands of Employee Lawsuits over Wage Theft, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www
.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-chipotle-20190104-story.html [https://
perma.cc/A6SK-YX6F] (observing that the restaurant chain “may have to defend
against hundreds, even thousands, of arbitration claims”).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
374. See Alison Frankel, FanDuel Wants N.Y. State Court to Shut Down Mass Consumer Arbitration, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc
-fanduel/fanduel-wants-n-y-state-court-to-shut-down-mass-consumer-arbitration
-idUSKBN1ZD2SK [https://web.archive.org/web/20200908163049/https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-otc-fanduel/fanduel-wants-n-y-state-court-to-shut-down
-mass-consumer-arbitration-idUSKBN1ZD2SK].
375. See Andrew Wallender, Corporate Arbitration Tactic Backfires as Claims Flood
In, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
daily-labor-report/corporate-arbitration-tactic-backfires-as-claims-flood-in [https://
perma.cc/PN97-75LQ] (reporting that Lyft faces 3,420 individual arbitrations).
376. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 231, at 54 (finding that plaintiffs’
lawyers filed about 200 arbitrations against the lender over the span of a few weeks).
377. See id. at 55 (reporting that one plaintiffs’ firm filed nearly 1,600 arbitrations
against Macy’s over about a month’s time).
378. The filings against AT&T and Sallie Mae may be motivated by other arbitration agreement structures. Before the Court made class arbitration waivers bulletproof, these companies created monetary incentives for plaintiffs to arbitrate lowvalue claims on an individual basis. See id. at 16. By doing so, the firms sought to defuse
objections that their class waivers were unfair. See id.
379. See Frankel, supra note 374.
380. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. R-56(a) (“The AAA may require the parties to deposit in advance of any hearings such sums of money as it deems
necessary to cover the expense of the arbitration, including the arbitrator’s fee . . . .”);
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54, at r. 31(b) (“JAMS requires that the Parties
deposit the fees and expenses for the Arbitration from time to time during the course
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cost is manageable if a corporation gets sued a handful of times. But it
swells to epic proportions when it is multiplied by the number of individuals who once would have constituted a class. For example, the
mass arbitrations against Uber resulted in JAMS sending the company
a $18,000,000 bill,381 and the AAA demanded more than $11,000,000
from Postmates.382
Three points about mass arbitrations are worth highlighting.
First, their social value is debatable. On the one hand, the very definition of a shakedown. The plaintiffs’ firms behind them seem to be trying to extort a quick settlement for less than the amount of the AAA or
JAMS deposits. Indeed, as DoorDash objected, the flood of filings are a
brazen attempt to “extract[] a multi-million dollar payment . . . in order to avoid the administrative costs of these arbitrations, irrespective
of the merits.”383 But on the other hand, the plaintiffs are merely asking firms to obey the terms of their own contracts. The fact that businesses are resisting individual arbitration—the very dispute resolution methodology they have championed—suggests that their
arbitration clauses are not meant to resolve claims, but rather to
thwart claims.384 Thus, as the judge presiding over the DoorDash case
observed, there is “poetic justice” in class arbitration waivers starting
to boomerang on drafters.385
Second, mass arbitrations fall into a doctrinal Bermuda Triangle.
Most companies have responded to these salvos of complaints by refusing to pay their deposits.386 In turn, the AAA and JAMS have invoked
of the proceedings and prior to the Hearing.”); Frankel, supra note 368 (“Under the
current rules of the American Arbitration Association, it costs companies $1,900 to
begin arbitrating with a single worker . . . .”); Alison Frankel, Uber Tells Its Side of the
Story in Mass Arbitration Fight with 12,500 Drivers, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2019), https://
www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-uber/uber-tells-its-side-of-the-story-in-mass
-arbitration-fight-with-12500-drivers-idUSKCN1PA2PD (describing the $1,500-percase charge for Uber to initiate individual arbitrations with JAMS).
381. Frankel, supra note 380.
382. Frankel, supra note 368.
383. Respondent DoorDash, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 2–3, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
2019) (No. 9-CV-07545). Adding credence to this theory, the same attorneys—Chicago-based Keller Lenkner—appear to be behind many mass arbitrations. See Frankel,
Uber, supra note 380.
384. Frankel, supra note 368 (“The companies . . . believed that when they insisted
that workers surrender their right to sue or arbitrate as a group, they’d effectively
squelched workers’ claims.”).
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Motion for an Order for Postmates to Show Cause Why It
Should Not be Held in Civil Contempt at 1, Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d
1246 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-CV-03042).
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provisions in their Arbitration Rules that allow them to terminate
cases when a party defaults on an invoice.387 What happens next is
unclear. Some courts have held that a defendant who declines to participate in arbitration either materially breaches the arbitration
agreement388 or waives its right to arbitration.389 Yet the remedy in
these situations is to allow the plaintiffs to refile their complaints in
court.390 This is not what the architects of mass arbitrations want. Instead, to maximize their settlement leverage, they have asked judges
to issue “order[s] compelling [the defendant] to tender its share of the
arbitration fees to the arbitrator so that the arbitrations may proceed.”391
387. See id. at 2; see also AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 23, at r. 57(f) (“If . . .
the parties have failed to make the full deposits requested within the time provided . . .
the arbitrator, or the AAA if an arbitrator has not been appointed, may terminate the
proceedings.”); JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 54, at r. 31(a)–(b) (establishing
sanctions for failure to deposit or pay fees).
388. See Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc., 430 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005) (reasoning
that any other approach would give employers “an incentive to refuse to arbitrate
claims brought by employees in the hope that the frustrated employees would simply
abandon them”); Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 155 A.3d 985, 995 (N.J. 2017) (“A failure
to advance required fees that results in the dismissal of the arbitration claim deprives
a party of the benefit of the agreement.”); Nadeau v. Equity Residential Props. Mgmt.
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3d 637, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[D]efendant materially breached the
Arbitration Agreement and therefore cannot use the Agreement to compel arbitration.”); cf. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 786 F.3d 1287, 1294–95 (10th Cir. 2015)
(applying this analysis to an employee who refused to pay arbitration fees).
389. See Cinel v. Barna, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 329, 335 (Ct. App. 2012) (“[B]y refusing
to agree among themselves to pay the fees of the nonpaying parties, both plaintiff and
defendant . . . have waived the arbitration agreement . . . .”); Sanderson Farms, Inc. v.
Gatlin, 848 So. 2d 828, 838 (Miss. 2003) (concluding that a party “waived its right to
arbitration by refusing to pay its one-half of the costs associated with filing and administrative fees”). But see Fogal v. Stature Constr., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 708, 718 (Tex. App.
2009) (holding that waiver means “attempt[ing] to ‘have it both ways by switching
between litigation and arbitration,’” and that merely failing to pay fees does not meet
this test (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 597 (Tex. 2008) (Johnson, J.,
concurring))). In addition, effective January 1, 2020, California has regulated a company’s non-payment of arbitration expenses by statute. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.97(a) (West 2020) (declaring that, in consumer and employment arbitrations,
a drafter’s failure to pay fees to a provider thirty days or more after they are due is
both a material breach of the arbitration agreement and waiver of right to compel).
390. See Roach, 155 A.3d at 995 (holding that non-payment of fees “bars the
breaching party from later compelling arbitration”). But see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.97(b)–(d) (allowing consumers and employees to either (1) compel arbitration
with breaching drafters and recover attorneys’ fees therefrom, or (2) to obtain sanctions from a court).
391. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Respondent’s Cross-Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings
at 1, Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-CV-
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Third, one provider has suggested a solution to the mass arbitration quandary, and its proposal highlights both the promise and peril
of arbitration rulemaking. In late 2019, CPR unveiled an EmploymentRelated Mass Claims Protocol.392 CPR’s regime calls for arbitrators to
decide a handful of “Test Cases”—which operate like bellwether trials
in mass torts—and then for the parties to conduct a global mediation
in light of the results.393 CPR’s lightning-fast response is a testament
to the agility of privatized procedure. Indeed, a similar revision to the
Federal Rules would have taken years.394 Yet there are also reasons
for skepticism about CPR’s motives. As argued earlier, arbitration administrators have incentives to please businesses.395 Notably, CPR’s
Protocol takes the wind out of plaintiffs’ sails by exponentially reducing the number of deposits that defendants must pay.396 Moreover, the
speed with which CPR acted is especially valuable for the gig economy
employers who are facing mass arbitrations. Gig workers must access

03042). Contra id. at 12 (ordering Postmates to arbitrate over 5,257 complaints, but
refusing “to compel Postmates to pay the arbitrator’s fee within a prescribed time-period or to pay future invoices related to the arbitrations”). Another judge in the Northern District of California required DoorDash to arbitrate 5,010 claims, Order Re Motion
to Compel Arbitration, Motion to Stay Proceedings, and Motion to Seal at 5, Abernathy
v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 9-CV-07545) [hereinafter
DoorDash Order], and heaped scorn on the company’s tactics:
For decades, the employer-side bar and their employer clients have forced
arbitration clauses upon workers, thus taking away their right to go to court,
and forced class-action waivers upon them too, thus taking away their ability
to join collectively to vindicate common rights. . . . The employer here, DoorDash, faced with having to actually honor its side of the bargain, now
blanches at the cost of the filing fees it agreed to pay in the arbitration
clause. . . . This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by this order.
Id. at 7–8.
392. INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., WHAT IS THE EMPLOYMENTRELATED MASS CLAIMS PROTOCOL? (2019), https://www.cpradr.org/dispute-resolution
-services/employment-related-mass-claims-documents/emp-mass-claims-protocol
[https://perma.cc/C5MY-24DH].
393. Id. at 2–4.
394. Pending Rules and Forms Amendments, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/pending-rules-and-forms-amendments [https://perma.cc/X2RS-836S]
(“An amendment to a federal rule generally takes about three years.”).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 223–30.
396. See Alaina Lancaster, “Poetic Justice”: Judge Alsup Berates DoorDash for Trying
to Escape Its Own Arbitration Agreement, LAW.COM: RECORDER (Nov. 26, 2019), https://
www.law.com/therecorder/2019/11/26/poetic-justice-judge-alsup-berates
-doordash-for-trying-to-escape-its-own-arbitration-agreement (reporting that, under
CPR’s new protocol, DoorDash would only have to arbitrate 10 claims, instead of the
2,236 filed claims accounting for $4.275 million in fees).
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an app—and assent to its terms—every time they accept a shift.397
Thus, these companies can amend their arbitration clauses in real
time.398 In fact, one day after the AAA terminated the arbitrations
against DoorDash, the business changed the Arbitration Rules in its
contact from the AAA’s to CPR’s.399
Given this background, it is not surprising that some disquieting
facts about CPR’s Protocol have recently come to light. Apparently, the
provider developed Arbitration Rules with defendants in pending
mass arbitrations. For example, the law firm representing both DoorDash and Postmates reached out to CPR to complain about mass arbitrations in the spring of 2019.400 That fall, CPR sent multiple drafts of
the Protocol to the firm, which offered “comments, questions, and recommendations” thereon.401 In return, CPR “asked to be notified when
the new DoorDash contracts providing for arbitration under CPR were
distributed.”402 Thus, there is evidence that an arbitration provider
changed its rules to attract new clients—precisely what we should expect from allowing companies to act as procedural rule-makers.
397. Id. (“‘You’ve set up this draconian system where before they can get their first
job at 5 a.m. you have to click through,’ [Judge] Alsup said.”).
398. Courts generally permit companies to amend the terms of their contracts unilaterally, provided that the original agreement includes a provision that authorizes
such changes. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 623–30 (2010) (tracking the history and development of unilateral modification clauses and their associated jurisprudence); Oren BarGill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (noting a provision in
a credit card agreement stating “We may change any term, condition, service or feature
of your account at any time. We will provide you with notice of the change to the extent
required by law.” (quoting Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 277 (Ct. App.
1998))).
399. Lancaster, supra note 396.
400. See DoorDash Order, supra note 391, at 7 (“Gibson Dunn reached out to CPR
to discuss issues DoorDash was having with filing fees for mass arbitrations . . . .”); Adams v. Postmates, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting representation of “Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent [Postmates]”
in a mass arbitration case pending during the same period as Abernathy v. DoorDash).
401. DoorDash Order, supra note 391, at 7; see also Ross Todd, Gibson Dunn, DoorDash’s Ties to New Mass Arbitration Protocol Can Be Explored, Judge Says, LAW.COM:
RECORDER (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/12/20/Gibson
-dunn-doordashs-ties-to-new-mass-arbitration-protocol-can-be-explored-judge
-says/. For whatever it’s worth, CPR asserts that it also “talked to lots of other sources,
including plaintiffs’ lawyers.” Alison Frankel, Ex-Judge Atop Controversial Mass Arbitration Program: Give It a Chance to Work, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-otc-massarb/ex-judge-atop-controversial-mass-arbitration
-program-give-it-a-chance-to-work-idUSKBN1YR1ZI [https://web.archive.org/web/
20200909020703/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-massarb/ex-judge-atopcontroversial-mass-arbitration-program-give-it-a-chance-to-work-idUSKBN1YR1ZI].
402. See DoorDash Order, supra note 391, at 7.
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CONCLUSION
For eighty years, the Federal Rules have dominated the field of
civil procedure. Yet some of the most influential rulemaking today occurs through the looking glass, in arbitration. Procedural codes written by arbitration providers do not subscribe to many of the basic assumptions of their public counterparts, such as inclusive drafting
processes, trans-substantivity, uniformity, and trying to balance efficiency and accuracy. Some of these differences expand parties’ dispute resolution options and foster procedural ingenuity. But others
exacerbate the power imbalance that is inherent in forced arbitration.
By being sensitive to the benefits and costs of the Arbitration Rules,
courts can do a better job assimilating private dispute resolution into
the civil justice system.

